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ESSAY 
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: TAXING 
CORPORATIONS OR SHAREHOLDERS (OR BOTH) 
David M. Schizer *  
The United States taxes both corporations and shareholders on 
corporate profits. In principle, the United States could rely on only one 
of these taxes, as many commentators have suggested. Although 
choosing to tax the corporation or its owners may seem like taking 
money from one pocket or the other, this Essay emphasizes a key dif-
ference: These taxes prompt different planning. Relying on one or the 
other mitigates some distortions and leaks, while exacerbating others. As 
a result, choosing which to impose is like navigating between Scylla and 
Charybdis. 
In response, this Essay recommends using both taxes for three 
reasons. First, if one tax is avoided, the other still raises some revenue. 
Second, if the goal is to deter a planning strategy, cutting the rate to 
zero is an overreaction. If the rate is low enough, paying a tax is 
cheaper than avoiding it, since tax planning is not free. Third, if one 
tax is cut instead of repealed, the other can be correspondingly lower. 
Even so, using two taxes poses challenges as well. First, although 
the taxes are supposed to backstop each other, they cannot do so when a 
planning strategy avoids both. Second, using two taxes is likely to 
increase administrative costs. Third, coordinating the taxes to produce 
the right combined rate—ideally the rate for noncorporate businesses—
is not easy. 
This Essay also canvasses reforms to shore up both taxes. While the 
focus is on incremental reform, this Essay’s central recommendation 
extends to more ambitious reforms as well. These reforms also benefit 
from using two taxes, instead of one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
So we sailed on through the narrow straits, crying aloud for fear of 
Scylla on the one hand while divine Charybdis sucked the sea in 
terribly on the other.1 
The United States taxes corporate profits twice. Corporations pay 
one tax, and shareholders pay another when they receive dividends or 
sell stock. Many commentators have criticized this “double tax,” pro-
posing instead to use only one of these taxes.2 For instance, some want to 
replace the corporate tax with a mark-to-market tax on shareholders.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1. 12 Homer, The Odyssey (A.S. Kline trans., Poetry in Translation 2004) (n.d.) 
(ebook). 
 2. See infra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
 3. The “realization” rule taxes shareholders only when they sell shares; in contrast, a 
“mark-to-market” rule taxes shareholders every year on changes in their shares’ value, 
even if they do not sell. See Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, Tax Policy Ctr., Major Surgery 
Needed: A Call for Structural Reform of the U.S. Corporate Income Tax 26–27 (2014) 
[hereinafter Toder & Viard, Major Surgery Needed], http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
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Other proposals to repeal the corporate tax emerged in the 2016 
presidential campaign.4 The mirror image is to keep the corporate tax 
and repeal the shareholder tax. For example, the “comprehensive busi-
ness income tax” (CBIT), considered in an influential 1992 U.S. Treasury  
  
                                                                                                                           
publications/major-surgery-needed-call-structural-reform-us-corporate-income-tax/full 
[http://perma.cc/V75F-86XK] (proposing to replace the corporate tax with a mark-to-
market shareholder tax); Eric Toder & Alan D. Viard, Am. Enter. Inst. & Tax Policy Ctr., A 
Proposal to Reform the Taxation of Corporate Income 2 (2016) [hereinafter Toder & 
Viard, A Proposal], http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/A-proposal-to-
reform-the-taxation-of-corporate-income.pdf [http://perma.cc/3QT5-BFX2] (revising the 
proposal so corporate tax is retained but at only a 15% rate); see also Joseph M. Dodge, A 
Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate–Shareholder Integration Proposal, 
50 Tax L. Rev. 265, 266–68 (1995) (proposing to repeal the corporate tax and to replace it 
with a mark-to-market tax on shareholders of public corporations and a pass-through 
regime for privately held corporations); Deborah H. Schenk, Complete Integration in a 
Partial Integration World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 697, 697 (1992) (“I propose that an expanded 
subchapter S applicable to most nonpublicly held corporations be combined with an 
accrual tax on publicly held corporations to produce a workable complete integration 
system.”); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 
134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1134–37 (1986) (proposing mark-to-market taxation for publicly 
traded stock and repeal of the corporate tax); Victor Thuronyi, The Taxation of 
Corporate Income—A Proposal for Reform, 2 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 109, 110 (1983) (“The 
basic thrust of the proposal is to repeal the corporate income tax on publicly held 
corporations and to tax their shareholders on the annual increase in value of their 
shares.”).  
Professor Michael Knoll would also tax corporate income based on changes in the 
value of corporate securities, but he would collect this tax from corporations. Michael S. 
Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (1996). Professor Knoll 
assumes there will be a separate entity tax, in addition to the personal income tax, but 
does not defend the use of a second tax. Id. at 5 n.18 (“Of course, this article presumes 
that there is an entity-level corporate tax. I defend neither the double tax on corporate 
income nor the income tax . . . .”). Professor Joseph Bankman has also proposed taxing 
corporations on annual changes in their market value. See Joseph Bankman, A Market-
Value Based Corporate Income Tax, 68 Tax Notes 1347, 1348 (1995). Like Professor 
Knoll, Professor Bankman assumes there will be a separate entity-level tax, but he observes 
that it “could be easily adapted to an integrated tax system. In that event, the [market 
value tax] would replace both the current entity-level corporate tax and the shareholder-
level tax on corporate distributions.” Id. at 1349. 
 4. For example, former Governor of Louisiana Bobby Jindal proposed to eliminate 
the corporate tax. Alex Swoyer, Bobby Jindal Unveils Tax Plan, Would Eliminate Corporate 
Tax, Breitbart (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/10/07/bobby-
jindal-unveils-tax-plan-eliminate-corporate-tax/ [http://perma.cc/W88G-YCMQ]. Senator 
Rand Paul proposed to replace it with a value-added tax. Rand Paul, Blow Up the Tax Code 
and Start Over, Wall St. J. (June 17, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/blow-up-
the-tax-code-and-start-over-1434582592 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (advocating 
for a “low, broad-based tax of 14.5% on individuals and businesses”); see also John H. 
Cochrane, Here’s What Genuine Tax Reform Looks Like, Wall St. J. (Dec. 22, 2015, 7:00 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/heres-what-genuine-tax-reform-looks-like-1450828827 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (calling for a repeal of the corporate tax). 
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report,5 would eliminate the dividend tax and possibly also the capital 
gains tax.6 
Although choosing to tax the corporation or its investors may seem 
like taking money from one pocket or the other, this Essay emphasizes a 
key difference: Corporate and shareholder taxes prompt different tax 
planning. Relying on one or the other mitigates some distortions and 
leaks, while exacerbating others. 
At one end of the spectrum, what if Congress repeals the corporate 
tax and relies only on a (higher) shareholder tax? The good news is that 
this step eliminates familiar distortions from the corporate tax, such as a 
firm’s incentive to earn income abroad and to change its tax residence.7 
But there is bad news as well. Because the shareholder tax is higher, the 
distortions it causes are more severe. For instance, shareholders have a 
stronger tax motivation to keep appreciated stock. In addition, tax-
exempt and foreign shareholders no longer pay tax (indirectly) through 
the corporate tax.8 
As a result, relying only on the shareholder tax is problematic. To 
deal with these concerns, Congress can move to the other end of the 
spectrum, repealing the shareholder tax and relying solely on a (higher) 
corporate tax. But although this step eliminates distortions from the 
shareholder tax (such as the incentive to hold onto appreciated stock), it 
exacerbates distortions from the corporate tax (such as the incentive to 
shift earnings).9 Since there are distortions either way, choosing which 
tax to use is like navigating between Scylla and Charybdis. 
                                                                                                                           
 5. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax 
Systems, Taxing Business Income Once (1992) [hereinafter Treasury, Integration Study], 
reprinted in Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of the U.S. Corporate 
and Individual Income Taxes 35, 119 (1998) [hereinafter Graetz & Warren, U.S. 
Corporate and Individual Income Taxes] (analyzing CBIT prototype). In the 2016 
campaign, Senator Marco Rubio made a proposal that was somewhat like CBIT: It would 
repeal investor-level taxes and tax corporations only at the entity level. See Elaine Maag, 
Roberton Williams, Jeff Rohaly & Jim Nunns, Tax Policy Ctr.: Urban Inst. & Brookings 
Inst., An Analysis of Marco Rubio’s Tax Plan 1 (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000606-an-analysis-of-
marco-rubios-tax-plan.pdf [http://perma.cc/L8W5-KJ9S] (analyzing Rubio’s suggested 
conversion of the federal income tax into a consumption tax by exempting most savings 
from both personal and business income taxes). 
 6. In analyzing CBIT, the Treasury did not take a firm position about whether to tax 
capital gains, noting that “the fundamental problem of capital gains taxation in CBIT is 
similar to that encountered in other integration prototypes and either resolution (to tax 
or to exempt capital gains) will be controversial.” Treasury, Integration Study, supra note 
5, at 152. The Treasury observed that firms could eliminate capital gains tax on retained 
earnings with a dividend reinvestment plan. Id. (“If capital gains are taxed under CBIT, 
corporations might implement a dividend-reinvestment plan . . . to reduce the incidence 
of double taxation on retained earnings.”). 
 7. See infra section I.B.1–.2. 
 8. See infra section I.C.4–.5. 
 9. See infra section I.B. 
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In response, this Essay recommends using both corporate and 
shareholder taxes. The two rates should be coordinated so that they 
aggregate to the combined rate Congress wants, which ideally would be 
the same as the rate on pass-through businesses (or, at least, close to it).10 
The main goal of this Essay, then, is to defend the use of both taxes—in 
essence, to show “how I learned to love the double tax”11—and to cali-
brate the balance between them. At first blush, this argument seems 
counterintuitive. If both taxes are distortive, isn’t it better to get rid of at 
least one? It seems odd to contend that “each tax is so flawed that we 
really need them both.” But in fact, this is the case. 
Using both taxes has three important advantages. First, if one is 
avoided, the other still raises some revenue. Second, if the goal is to deter 
a planning strategy, cutting the rate to zero is an overreaction. When the 
rate is low enough, paying a tax is cheaper than avoiding it, since tax 
planning is not free. For example, a firm’s incentive to shift income 
abroad can be eliminated not only by repealing the corporate tax, as 
noted above, but also by cutting the rate to 10% or 15% (so it is 
competitive with the corporate rate in other countries). Third, if one tax 
is cut instead of repealed, the other can be correspondingly lower, and 
thus induces less planning. Proposals to use only one tax on business 
profits typically neglect these advantages of using two.12 
Even so, using two taxes poses challenges as well. First, although the 
taxes are supposed to backstop each other, they cannot do so when a 
planning strategy avoids both.13 Second, ensuring that two taxes agg-
regate to a particular rate is not easy.14 This coordination is fairly blunt 
unless we shore up both taxes, so they are hard to avoid, and also use a 
sophisticated mechanism like an imputation system, which gives share-
holders a credit for tax already paid by the corporation.15 Third, using 
two taxes can increase administrative costs.16 
                                                                                                                           
 10. In the United States, “pass-through businesses,” which include partnerships, 
limited liability companies, and S-corporations, are subjected to only one level of tax. In 
contrast, “C-corporations” are subjected to two taxes. See infra section I.A.1. 
 11. Professor Herwig Schlunk uses a similar phrase in offering a very different 
justification for two taxes: One (the corporate tax) can fund services to businesses, and the 
other (the shareholder tax) can fund services to individuals. See Herwig J. Schlunk, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Double Taxation, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 127, 171–77 
(2003). 
 12. Professor David Gamage has also emphasized the advantages of using multiple 
taxes, instead of a single instrument. David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor 
Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 Tax L. Rev. 355, 357 (2014). But 
he does not focus on corporate tax reform. As this Essay shows, this is a setting where this 
argument has particular resonance. Instead, Professor Gamage recommends separate 
taxes on labor income, consumption, capital income, and wealth. Id. at 358. 
 13. See infra section II.B.1. 
 14. See infra section II.B.2. 
 15. See infra section IV.D. 
 16. See infra section II.B.3. 
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Once Congress chooses the combined rate on corporate profits, how 
should it allocate this burden between corporate and shareholder taxes? 
Since lower rates discourage planning, the more distortive tax should be 
lower. The corporate tax is probably more distortive, so it should be cut 
significantly.17 The shareholder tax should be increased to make up the 
difference (or at least some of it). 
How much of the tax burden should be shifted from the corporation 
to shareholders? Since the answer depends on how distortive each tax is, 
the analysis changes when reforms ease distortions in one tax or the 
other. For example, if a reform makes the shareholder tax harder to 
avoid, even a high shareholder rate does not motivate taxpayers to avoid 
the tax (since the reform keeps them from doing so). Once the share-
holder tax becomes more reliable in this way, the corporate tax does not 
need to collect as much revenue, so its rate can be cut. In other words, 
shoring up the shareholder tax allows more of the tax burden to be 
shifted from corporations to shareholders. At the same time, the mirror 
image is also true: If a reform makes the corporate tax harder to avoid, 
this tax collects more revenue with fewer distortions, so the shareholder 
tax can be cut. Therefore, both taxes should be strengthened with incre-
mental reforms. As each becomes more reliable—and thus collects more 
revenue with fewer distortions—the other does not have to collect as 
much revenue. This allows the other tax to use a lower rate, so it 
becomes less distortive. The bottom line, then, is that reforms ease the 
tradeoff between collecting tax from corporations, on the one hand, and 
shareholders, on the other. 
In theory, if reforms could eliminate all distortions from one tax—so 
it could collect as much revenue as is needed without changing taxpayer 
behavior—the other tax would no longer be necessary. Yet as a practical 
matter, even fundamental reforms cannot eliminate every distortion; as a 
result, this Essay shows that these more ambitious reforms also benefit 
from using two taxes, instead of one.18 For instance, repealing the 
corporate tax and replacing it with a mark-to-market tax on shareholders 
offers the significant advantage of eliminating the incentive to shift 
income. But this reform creates a new distortion: Stock in a public firm is 
taxed less favorably than investments that do not have to be marked to 
market. Even so, using two taxes can mitigate this distortion. If a modest 
corporate tax is retained, the shareholder rate can be lower, making 
stock more competitive with other investments. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, six clarifications are in order. 
First, this Essay focuses on publicly traded businesses, since private firms 
usually do not pay corporate tax under current law and use other 
                                                                                                                           
 17. See infra section III.A.2. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
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planning strategies that are mostly beyond this Essay’s scope.19 Second, 
this Essay generally assumes that income is the tax base, although some 
consumption-tax alternatives are discussed briefly as well.20 Third, the 
goal is to maximize national welfare, instead of global welfare.21 Fourth, 
this Essay does not focus on distribution, since the alternatives it 
compares—corporate and shareholder taxes—both tax capital income, and 
thus reach high-income taxpayers. Even so, distributional effects can still 
vary if the incidence of these taxes is different.22 Fifth, this Essay focuses 
on where rates and rules should end up. How the transition should be 
managed—including whether changes apply only to new firms or new 
equity (e.g., to avoid windfalls), as well as whether changes should be 
phased in gradually—is beyond this Essay’s scope. Finally, the focus here 
is on policy instead of politics, although political constraints are discus-
sed briefly.23 
This Essay proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains why nominally 
equivalent corporate and shareholder taxes induce different planning, 
and it surveys strategies used to avoid a high corporate tax, on the one 
hand, and a high shareholder tax, on the other. In response to these 
dueling distortions, Part II recommends using both taxes. Part III 
considers what the division of labor should be between these two taxes, as 
well as how to strengthen each with targeted reforms. Part IV extends the 
analysis to more comprehensive reforms, showing that they also benefit 
from using two taxes, instead of one. 
                                                                                                                           
 19. For example, high corporate rates can induce controlling shareholders to spend 
more on corporate expenses with a consumption element, such as expensive health plans, 
business travel, or company cars. See, e.g., Scott Lynch, 26 Small Business Experts Reveal 
Their Top Tax Tips for Small Business Owners to Get Bigger Tax Breaks, Direct Capital: 
Bus. Insights (Dec. 17, 2014), http://blog.directcapital.com/business-insights/small-
business-tax-tips/ [http://perma.cc/BVY6-JDWS]. In addition, as discussed below, diff-
erences between the corporate and personal rates can influence how much cash 
controlling shareholders leave in the firm, as well as their preference for salary or 
dividends. See infra sections I.C.2–.3. 
 20. This assumption does not flow from a conviction that income is a better base, 
since there are reasons to prefer consumption. See generally Joseph Bankman & David A. 
Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 
Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 1414 (2006). Rather, this Essay focuses on income based on the 
assumption that corporate tax reform is likely to proceed incrementally. 
 21. For a discussion of the relative merits of maximizing global or national welfare in 
designing international tax rules, see Daniel N. Shaviro, Fixing U.S. International 
Taxation 15 (2014). 
 22. The concept of tax incidence describes who bears the economic burden of a tax. 
In some cases, those who pay a tax—in the sense that they write the check—are able to 
shift this cost to others and thus do not really bear it. For a discussion of this concept, see 
infra section I.B.6. 
 23. See infra section III.B. 
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I. DUELING DISTORTIONS: SOME ARISE ONLY IN TAXING CORPORATIONS, 
WHILE OTHERS ARISE ONLY IN TAXING SHAREHOLDERS 
Should tax on businesses be collected from the business itself, its 
investors, or both? This choice would be unimportant—like taking money 
from one pocket or the other—if corporate and shareholder taxes were 
interchangeable. But in fact, these taxes measure income differently. Some 
planning strategies avoid one tax but not the other. As a result, the choice 
to tax corporations or shareholders influences which distortions arise, as 
well as how much revenue is raised. 
In principle, there are two ways to deter these planning strategies. 
One is to tighten up the relevant rules, so the strategies would no longer 
be effective at reducing the tax bill. Parts III and IV offer examples of 
how to reform the relevant rules. But unfortunately, these reforms face 
familiar administrative and political barriers, which have impeded reform 
so far and may well continue to do so. 
Alternatively, a second way to deter planning strategies is to cut (or 
even repeal) the relevant tax. After all, avoiding a 15% tax offers less tax 
savings—and thus justifies less effort and expense—than avoiding a 40% 
tax. 
Yet even though cutting one tax eases the distortions it causes, this 
progress comes at a cost: If Congress makes up the revenue by increasing 
the other tax, the distortions from this tax become more severe. In other 
words, changing the mix of rates solves one set of problems but exa-
cerbates another. For instance, a low (or 0%) corporate rate reduces the 
appeal of strategies to avoid the corporate tax, which are described in 
section I.B. Yet if the cut in the corporate tax is funded with an increase 
in the shareholder tax—so, for instance, the corporate tax is 0% and the 
shareholder tax is 40%—taxpayers would have a correspondingly stronger 
incentive to avoid shareholder taxes. A key point, moreover, is that they 
would use different strategies to do so. As a result, the system would 
confront another set of distortions and challenges, which are canvassed 
in section I.C. 
Because of these dueling distortions, collecting tax from either 
corporations or shareholders is quite difficult, especially when the rate is 
high. As a result, relying on only one of these taxes is problematic. Part II 
shows why it is better to use both taxes, instead of only one. But first, this 
Part surveys the challenges with each tax to show why it matters whether 
tax is collected from corporations or shareholders. 
A. Corporate or Shareholder Taxes: Why It Matters 
The current rules for taxing businesses cause familiar distortions. 
Corporations are not taxed the same as pass-through entities, and debt is 
1858 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:1849 
 
taxed differently than equity.24 Not only are the rates different, but the 
number of taxes is also not the same. In some cases, only the investor is 
taxed; in others, the entity also pays tax. At first blush, who is billed for a 
tax seems much less important than the size of this bill. But in fact, the 
choice to tax corporations or shareholders matters a great deal, since 
these taxes define income differently. As a result, different planning 
strategies are used, so the distortions and revenue are not the same. 
1. Current Law: Different Tax Burdens and a Different Number of Taxes. — 
Under current law, two familiar variables influence how large a business’s 
tax burden is, as well as whether the business or its investors write the 
check. The first variable is whether the business is taxed as a corporation 
or a pass-through entity. Businesses taxed as corporations are called “C-
corporations.” They are subject to a heavier tax burden, and tax is 
collected from both the firm and its owners. In the top bracket under 
current law, the firm pays a 35% corporate tax,25 and shareholders pay a 
23.8% tax when they receive a dividend or sell stock.26 
In contrast, pass-through entities are subject to a lower tax burden 
and are taxed only once. The pass-through entity itself pays no tax. 
Instead, its owners pay the only tax, using the “personal” rate that applies 
to salaries, which currently is 39.6% in the top bracket.27 As a result, the 
combined rate for C-corporations (50.5%)28 is higher than the rate for 
pass-through entities (39.6%). 
A second variable also affects a business’s tax treatment: whether the 
firm is capitalized with debt or equity. Under current law, the extra tax 
burden on C-corporations, described above, arises only for equity and 
not for debt. When a C-corporation makes interest payments, the rev-
enue funding these payments is taxed only once; the corporation is not 
taxed, since it can deduct interest payments.29 Instead, only investors are 
                                                                                                                           
 24. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Am. Law Inst., Integration of Individual and Corporate 
Income Taxes (1993) [hereinafter Warren, ALI Integration Report], reprinted in Graetz 
& Warren, U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, supra note 5, at 618–22 (noting 
that differences in the treatment of corporations and pass-through entities, as well as 
differences in the treatment of corporate debt and equity, breed familiar distortions). 
 25. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2012) (establishing a 35% tax rate for income above $10 
million). 
 26. The stated rate is 20%. Id. § 1(h)(1)(D). There also is a 3.8% surtax on net 
investment income. Id. § 1411(a)(1). 
 27. For example, assume a limited liability company (LLC) that is wholly owned by 
an individual earns $100. The LLC pays no tax, and the owner pays $39.60 of tax. See id. 
§ 1 (establishing a 39.6% rate for ordinary income in the top bracket). 
 28. For example, if a corporation that is wholly owned by one shareholder earns 
$100, the corporation pays $35 of corporate tax. If the corporation pays a $65 dividend, its 
shareholder pays a 20% capital gains tax of $13 and a 3.8% surtax on net investment 
income of $2.47 (assuming the shareholder is in the top bracket). See id. § 1411. As a 
result, $49.53 is left after $50.47 is paid in taxes. 
 29. Id. § 163(a) (authorizing a deduction for an interest expense). 
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taxed (i.e., on the interest payments they receive).30 These lenders are 
taxed at their personal rate, which is 39.6% in the top bracket.31 So under 
current law, corporate equity bears a higher tax burden (50.5%) than 
corporate debt (39.6%). 
Notably, the same tax burden (nominally) applies to both pass-
through equity and corporate debt (39.6%), and each is subject to only 
one tax. This tax is collected from owners in the case of pass-through 
entities and from lenders in the case of debt owed by C-corporations. 
2. Nominal Equivalence of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes. — Of the 
two differences highlighted above—the rate and the number of taxes—the 
first initially seems more important. The difference between the 50.5% and 
39.6% rates obviously matters. But the choice to collect tax from the firm 
or its shareholders appears to be less significant, since these taxpayers are 
related. After all, if a taxpayer has two bank accounts, does it matter if tax 
is collected from one or the other? Similarly, why should it matter if tax is 
collected from the owner’s bank account, instead of the business’s bank 
account? 
If this initial impression is correct—so rates are important, but the 
choice to tax the business or its owners is not—the right solution is to 
conform the rates. This step, by itself, should eliminate the relevant 
distortions. 
For example, assume Congress wants to tax all business profits at 
40% and also uses 40% as the personal rate. (This Essay uses 40% as a 
recurring example, but this round number is merely illustrative and is 
not intended as a recommendation.)32 In principle, a 40% combined rate 
can be implemented with a 40% corporate rate and no shareholder tax,33 
a 40% shareholder tax and no corporate tax,34 or a 22.5% rate for both.35 
                                                                                                                           
 30. Id. § 61(a)(4) (including interest income in gross income). 
 31. For example, assume a corporation borrows $2,000 from a lender, paying 5% 
interest of $100 per year. If the corporation uses this capital to generate $100 of revenue, 
the corporation can deduct the $100 of interest from $100 of revenue and therefore has 
no taxable income (and nothing to distribute as a dividend to shareholders). The lender 
has $100 of interest income and pays $39.60 of tax (assuming the lender is in the top 
bracket). 
 32. For a discussion of factors relevant to the choice of the combined rate, see infra 
section III.A.1. 
 33. A total of $40 of corporate tax is imposed on $100 of earnings. The remaining 
$60 can be distributed tax-free to the investor. 
 34. If the corporation earns $100, it pays no entity-level tax. The shareholder pays a 
$40 tax, leaving $60 after taxes. 
 35. The right percentage is 22.5%, instead of 20%, since one tax is imposed on what 
is left over after the other has been paid. For instance, if $100 of corporate earnings is 
taxed at 22.5%, and the remaining $77.50 is distributed, the shareholder pays tax on the 
$77.50 and not on the original $100. Therefore, the shareholder has $60 after paying a 
22.5% tax of $17.50. 
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Indeed, any of the pairs of rates in the following table seem to raise the 
same revenue and affect taxpayers in similar ways:36 
TABLE 1: NOMINALLY EQUIVALENT PAIRS OF CORPORATE AND 
SHAREHOLDER TAX RATES: COMBINED TAX OF 40% 
Personal 
Rate 
Corporate 
Rate 
Shareholder 
Rate 
Corporation’s 
After-Tax 
Profit on 
$100 of 
Earnings 
Dividend 
Tax if 
Corporation 
Distributes 
After-Tax 
Profit 
Shareholder’s 
After-Tax 
Profit 
40.00% 35.00% 7.80% $65.00 $5.00 $60.00 
40.00% 29.50% 15.00% $70.50 $10.50 $60.00 
40.00% 27.00% 18.00% $73.00 $13.00 $60.00 
40.00% 25.00% 20.00% $75.00 $15.00 $60.00 
40.00% 20.00% 25.00% $80.00 $20.00 $60.00 
40.00% 18.00% 27.00% $82.00 $22.00 $60.00 
40.00% 15.00% 29.50% $85.00 $25.00 $60.00 
40.00% 7.80% 35.00% $92.20 $32.20 $60.00 
 
Since these pairs of rates all yield the same combined 40% rate, they 
all initially seem equivalent, and thus seem equally able to eliminate the 
inconsistencies described above. All of these pairs seem to align the 40% 
personal rate with a 40% combined tax on corporate equity.37 In so do-
ing, each rate pair appears to conform the tax on corporate equity with 
the tax on pass-through equity, as well as the tax on debt. 
3. Why Nominally Equivalent Taxes Are Different: Component-Rate 
Strategies. — But in fact, conforming rates is not enough. Although a 40% 
corporate rate might seem the same as a 40% shareholder rate, this 
apparent equivalence is misleading. Even when rates are the same, the 
tax treatment can still be different, since rates alone do not determine 
the tax burden. Rather, the definition of income is another key factor, 
and corporate and shareholder taxes use different definitions under 
current law. As a result, these taxes have different gaps, so a 40% cor-
porate tax does not have the same effects or collect the same revenue as a 
40% shareholder tax. In principle, Congress could conform these def-
                                                                                                                           
 36. More generally, the pass-through tax (P) equals the combined corporate (C) and 
shareholder tax (S) when: (1 - P) = (1 - C) (1 - S). 
 37. Cf. George K. Yin, Achieving Integration Through Double Taxation, 56 Tax 
Notes 1365, 1367 (1992) (proposing an approach that would ask “whether the total 
income tax burden of a particular investor on corporate-source earnings, taking into 
account both the shareholder and corporate taxes, can be equated with the burden of that 
investor on the same amount of noncorporate-source earnings”). 
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initions of income, but this would require substantial changes in the 
relevant rules. 
Indeed, there are five well-understood differences in these regimes. 
First, the corporate tax measures a firm’s earnings, while the shareholder 
tax measures a shareholder’s dividends and capital gains. In the long 
run, these metrics may well yield the same amount of income, since stock 
prices—and thus an investor’s capital gains—are supposed to be a 
forecast of the firm’s future earnings.38 But in the short run, these two 
measures can diverge. 
Second, and relatedly, corporate and shareholder taxes do not come 
due at the same time, since some steps trigger one tax but not the other. 
For example, assume a shareholder buys stock in a corporation, which 
then rises in value because the firm buys an asset that appreciates. Sale of 
the asset triggers corporate tax, while sale of the stock triggers share-
holder tax. Taking one of these steps triggers only one tax, not the 
other.39 
Third, these taxes have different geographic boundaries. As a result, 
the shareholder tax sometimes applies when the corporate tax does not, 
and vice versa. For instance, assume a foreign corporation earns money 
abroad and distributes it to shareholders who are U.S. citizens. The 
corporation does not pay tax on this profit (since foreign corporations 
pay tax only on income earned in the United States),40 but U.S. share-
holders do pay tax on these dividends (since dividends of U.S. share-
holders are taxed, regardless of where the firm earned the profits).41 In 
other words, this profit is taxed at the shareholder level, but not the 
corporate level.42 
                                                                                                                           
 38. See Knoll, supra note 3, at 2–3 (“In an efficient market, . . . the change in the 
aggregate market value of the corporation’s shares will equal the change in the 
corporation’s expected future returns, or its periodic income.”). 
 39. Professor David Weisbach has described this as the “dual ownership” problem 
and has argued that it is a source of “irreducible complexity” in the corporate tax. David 
A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and 
Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 Tax L. Rev. 215, 215 (2007). 
 40. I.R.C. §§ 881–882 (2012) (taxing foreign corporations on income from U.S. 
sources). 
 41. Id. § 61(a)(7); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International 
Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301, 1317 (1996) (“Domestic 
taxpayers are taxed by the United States because of their personal connection to the 
United States, that is, on the basis of residence; . . . [f]oreign taxpayers are taxed . . . on 
the basis of their territorial connection to the United States, that is, on the basis of 
source.”). 
 42. The opposite can also be true. For instance, assume a foreign corporation earns 
money in the United States, and this profit increases the value of stock held by foreign 
shareholders. The firm has to pay U.S. corporate tax (since the firm earned the income in 
the United States), see I.R.C. §§ 881–882, but foreign shareholders do not owe any U.S. 
tax (since foreigners do not have to pay U.S. capital gains tax). Id. §§ 881, 871(a)(2) 
(taxing foreigners’ capital gains only if they satisfy the residence requirement). So in this 
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A fourth difference arises when Congress pursues goals other than 
raising revenue. For some tax expenditures,43 Congress uses the 
shareholder tax, but not the corporate tax. For other tax expenditures, 
the opposite is true. For example, Congress enacted the production tax 
credit to promote green energy.44 If a corporation produces electricity 
with wind turbines, this credit reduces its corporate tax bill. But if the 
firm distributes profits from wind energy to shareholders, the dividend 
tax still applies.45 
Finally, another difference between corporate and shareholder taxes 
is that taxpayers face different nontax costs (or “frictions”) in avoiding 
them. For example, to reduce their corporate tax bills, firms can draw on 
sophisticated legal and financial expertise. In contrast, shareholders who 
want to avoid the shareholder tax may not have access to the same 
expertise. 
Because corporate and shareholder taxes do not have the same gaps, 
some planning strategies reduce one tax, but not the other. To describe 
strategies that avoid only one of these taxes, this Essay uses the term 
“component-rate” strategies. For instance, holding on to appreciated stock 
defers only the shareholder tax. As a result, this strategy affects only a 
component of the overall tax on corporate profits (i.e., the shareholder 
tax, but not the corporate tax). 
In contrast, “combined-rate” strategies avoid both corporate and 
shareholder taxes. For example, organizing a venture as a nonprofit 
avoids both taxes.46 The same is true of organizing a business as a pass-
through entity; the personal rate applies, instead of the corporate or 
shareholder rate. 
4. Allocating the Tax Burden Between Corporations and Shareholders. — 
To summarize, taxpayers respond differently to corporate and share-
holder taxes. So even when these taxes are coordinated to yield a 
particular combined rate, taxpayers use different planning strategies, 
depending on whether tax is collected from corporations or share-
holders. Yet although the allocation between these taxes is very imp-
ortant for some strategies, it is less important for others. Specifically, this 
                                                                                                                           
case, the U.S. government taxes the profit at the corporate level, but not at the shareholder 
level. 
 43. A “tax expenditure” is a tax rule that advances policy goals other than raising 
revenue. For instance, the deduction for mortgage interest promotes home ownership. 
See generally David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 Tax L. Rev. 275, 284–85 
(2015) (noting that tax expenditures fund a wide range of activities, such as charity, clean 
energy, and education). 
 44. I.R.C. § 45(a). 
 45. See generally Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate 
and Shareholder Taxes, 69 Nat’l Tax J. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Graetz & Warren, 
Integration of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes] (manuscript at 14), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2780490 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that the current law 
avoids passing through corporate tax preferences to shareholders). 
 46. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (exempting certain organizations from tax). 
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allocation matters more for component-rate strategies (which avoid only 
one tax) than for combined-rate strategies (which avoid both). 
a. Effect of the Allocation on Component-Rate Strategies. — For component-
rate strategies, the mix of corporate and shareholder taxes is important 
for two reasons. First, it influences how much revenue the government 
loses from these strategies. For instance, holding stock until death avoids 
the shareholder tax but not the corporate tax.47 Therefore, revenue falls 
to zero if the shareholder tax is 40% (and the corporate tax is 0%), but it 
is unaffected if the shareholder rate is 0% (and the corporate rate is 
40%). 
Second, this allocation also affects whether component-rate strat-
egies are cost effective for taxpayers. After all, tax planning is not free. 
Taxpayers have to pay advisors and modify their behavior. These nontax 
costs are justified only when they are less than the tax savings. The break-
even point varies among taxpayers, since a strategy can be easier for 
some than others. But in general, some planning is cost effective for 
avoiding a high tax, but not a low tax. 
For instance, if the corporate rate is 40% and the shareholder rate is 
0%, taxpayers abandon even the cheapest ways to avoid shareholder tax. 
But if the shareholder rate is increased to 22.5%, some strategies become 
cost effective.48 If the rate is increased further, additional strategies 
become appealing.49 At the same time, if the corporate rate is cut—to 
keep the combined rate at 40%—some ways to avoid the corporate tax 
cease to be cost effective. In other words, the balance between share-
holder and corporate taxes influences the viability of strategies targeting 
one tax or the other. 
b. Effect of the Allocation on Combined-Rate Strategies. — Yet although 
this allocation between shareholder and corporate taxes is quite 
important for a component-rate strategy (which avoids one tax), it is less 
important for a combined-rate strategy (which avoids both). In deciding 
whether to use combined-rate strategies, taxpayers still compare the strat-
egies’ costs and benefits (as taxpayers do with component-rate strat-
egies), but the payoff from combined-rate strategies is different: avoiding 
both taxes, instead of only one. 
For instance, in deciding whether to use a pass-through entity in-
stead of a corporation, taxpayers focus on the aggregate of the corporate 
and shareholder rates. If the personal rate is 40%, a pass-through entity 
                                                                                                                           
 47. Id. § 1014. 
 48. For instance, hedging appreciated stock with derivatives is more plausible to 
avoid a 30% tax than a 10% tax. For a discussion of hedging stock, see David M. Schizer, 
Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312, 1339–59 (2001) 
[hereinafter Schizer, Frictions]. 
 49. Once the shareholder rate is high enough, most strategies are already in use, so 
further increases induce relatively little additional planning. I am grateful to Professor 
Tom Brennan for this observation. 
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offers no tax advantage when the corporate rate is 40% and the 
shareholder rate is 0%. The same is true if the corporate rate is 0% and 
the shareholder rate is 40%. The key is that the corporate and share-
holder rates aggregate to 40%, but the balance between them is less 
important. 
Yet it is an oversimplification to say that the allocation between 
corporate and shareholder rates is entirely irrelevant to combined-rate 
strategies. Rather, the balance between these taxes can have second-order 
effects, as long as a key condition is satisfied: One of the component 
taxes—that is, either the corporate tax or the shareholder tax—has to be 
easier to avoid than the other. When this is the case—and Congress 
allocates more of the combined burden to the easily avoided tax—less 
combined tax is collected. 
For instance, assume the corporate tax is easy to avoid, but the share-
holder and personal taxes are not. If the (easy-to-avoid) corporate tax is 
40% and the (hard-to-avoid) shareholder tax is 0%, the true burden is 
less than 40% (since taxpayers will avoid some of this 40% tax). As a res-
ult, corporations have an advantage over pass-through entities. But this 
advantage is eliminated—so the true burden is closer to 40%—if the 
(easy-to-avoid) corporate rate is 0% and the (hard-to-avoid) shareholder 
rate is 40%.50 
The bottom line, then, is that the allocation of tax between 
corporations and shareholders influences the cost effectiveness of various 
planning strategies. Changing the mix of rates can deter some strategies, 
while encouraging others. 
B. High Corporate Taxes: Planning Strategies and Other Challenges 
As the last section showed, even when corporate and shareholder 
taxes are coordinated to produce a specific combined rate (e.g., 40%), 
the allocation between these taxes still matters. It affects how taxpayers 
respond, as well as how much revenue is raised. To show why the allo-
                                                                                                                           
 50. In principle, the allocation between corporate and shareholder taxes also matters 
if these taxes pursue different goals. For instance, Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued 
that the corporate tax limits corporate power by reducing the resources under corporate 
control. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1244–46 (2004). Although shareholder taxes do not 
drain corporate resources in the same way, this Essay does not focus on this difference, 
since the corporate tax is a blunt way to limit corporate power; unlike antitrust, it is not 
limited to firms with market power. Another potential difference is that these taxes might 
fund different government services. According to Professor Schlunk, the corporate tax 
should fund services to businesses, while the shareholder tax should fund services to 
individuals. See Schlunk, supra note 11, at 138–39. Yet this distinction is not easy to draw. 
Is thwarting a terrorist attack on an Apple store a service to the business or the people who 
work and shop there? In any event, distinguishing services provided to businesses and 
individuals—especially in the cross-border context, which Professor Schlunk analyzes—can 
be accomplished in other ways (e.g., different source rules for active and passive income, 
instead of two taxes). 
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cation between corporate and shareholder taxes is so important, this sec-
tion canvasses distortions and challenges that arise with a high corporate 
tax, but not a high shareholder tax. For instance, if the corporate tax is 
40% and the shareholder tax is 0%, how would taxpayers respond? This 
section surveys a range of planning strategies to avoid this high corporate 
tax. 
1. Shifting Income Abroad. — Perhaps the most important problem 
that arises with a high corporate rate—but not a high shareholder rate—
is the incentive to shift income to other jurisdictions. Earning income 
abroad—or, at least, treating it as earned abroad—reduces the corporate 
tax burden of both foreign and U.S. firms, albeit for somewhat different 
reasons. Foreign corporations generally pay U.S. corporate tax only on 
U.S. earnings.51 Likewise, U.S. firms generally pay current U.S. tax only 
on U.S. earnings and can defer U.S. tax on foreign earnings.52 As a result, 
the corporate tax consequences change when income is sourced abroad. 
This incentive to shift income is especially strong because the U.S. 
corporate rate (35%) is the highest in the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).53 In contrast, Ireland’s rate is 
12.5%, and the United Kingdom’s rate is 20%.54 
In motivating firms to shift their income abroad, high corporate 
taxes induce two types of distortions. First, firms move assets and jobs 
abroad, even if they would rather operate in the United States.55 As the 
gap in rates widens, more investment flows to low-tax jurisdictions,56 
shifting assets to owners with less expertise or fewer synergies with other 
                                                                                                                           
 51. I.R.C. §§ 881–882. 
 52. When a foreign subsidiary earns income abroad in an active business, no U.S. tax 
is due until the subsidiary pays a dividend to its U.S. parent. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income 
of Foreign Subsidiaries: A Review of the Basic Analytics, 145 Tax Notes 321, 322–24 (2014) 
(explaining that foreign earnings in a low-tax jurisdiction can compound at the low-tax 
jurisdiction’s tax rate). 
 53. Table II.1 Corporate Income Tax Rate, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., 
http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=58204 [http://perma.cc/2SXL-23VX] (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2016) (listing the corporate tax rates in OECD countries). 
 54. Id. Excluding the United States, the nations in the OECD have an average 
statutory rate (including state and provincial taxes) of 24.8%, compared with a rate of 
39.1% in the United States. Martin Sullivan, The Truth About Corporate Tax Rates, Forbes 
(Mar. 25, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/03/25/the-
truth-about-corporate-tax-rates/#1bbeebd20a54 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 55. Commentators describe this tax distortion as a violation of capital-export 
neutrality. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Taxing International Corporate Income Efficiently, 
53 Tax L. Rev. 225, 227 (2000) (defining capital-export neutrality). 
 56. See Ruud A. De Mooij & Sjef Ederveen, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: 
A Synthesis of Empirical Research, 10 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 673, 690 (2003) (finding that a 
1% reduction in the host-country tax rate yields a median increase in foreign investment 
of 3.3%); see also Tim Dowd, Paul Landefeld & Anne Moore, Joint Comm. on Taxation, 
Profit Shifting of U.S. Multinationals 4 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711968 (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining that rate cuts in low-tax jurisdictions induce 
even more pronounced effects than rate cuts in high-tax jurisdictions). 
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assets.57 Since real activity is harder to shift in some sectors than in 
others, tax distorts capital allocation across sectors.58 Second, income can 
be shifted not only with changes in real activity but also with familiar 
planning strategies.59 
As a result, a great deal of income is shifted abroad,60 costing the 
United States approximately $100 billion of annual revenue61 and distort-
                                                                                                                           
 57. This distortion is known as a violation of “capital ownership neutrality.” See Mihir 
A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 Nat’l Tax J. 487, 
494 (2003) (outlining how “capital ownership neutrality” may be satisfied through tax 
exemptions). 
 58. See Erik Cederwall, Reconciling the Profit-Shifting Debate, 150 Tax Notes 713, 
714 (2016) (“There is clear evidence that significant heterogeneity exists among 
[multinational enterprises] regarding their capacity and desire to shift profits, and the 
costs and benefits of profit shifting vary substantially.”). 
 59. For example, even if profitable innovations are developed in Silicon Valley, a 
subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction (a “low-tax sub”) can hold the patents, shifting income 
when a U.S. affiliate pays (deductible) royalties to the low-tax sub. With the right planning, 
the United States does not tax this income until it is paid as a dividend to the U.S. parent. 
See generally Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International 
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 
347, 394 (2013) (“Income from IP is much more mobile than the highly skilled workers 
and entrepreneurs who create it.”). Increasing the tax differential between affiliates by 1% 
is thought to increase the low-tax affiliate’s patent applications by 3.5%. See Tom 
Karkinsky & Nadine Riedel, Corporate Taxation and the Choice of Patent Location Within 
Multinational Firms, 88 J. Int’l Econ. 176, 182 (2012) (finding “the corporate tax rate 
exerts a significantly negative impact on the affiliates’ number of patent applications”); id. 
at 177 (“Quantitatively, the coefficient estimates are sizable, implying semi-elasticities of 
around −3.5.”). Likewise, a 1% reduction in this differential is estimated to increase the 
high-tax affiliate’s intellectual property holdings by 2.2%. Matthias Dischinger & Nadine 
Riedel, Corporate Taxes and the Location of Intangible Assets Within Multinational Firms, 
95 J. Pub. Econ. 691, 697–98 (2011). 
 60. See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R40623, Tax Havens: 
International Tax Avoidance and Evasion 18 (2015) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R40623.pdf [http://perma.cc/PFF7-3JHH] (noting that profits reported in 2010 by U.S. 
affiliates in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands represent 1,614% and 2,065% of these 
nations’ GDPs and explaining that some of this income is shifted from the United States, 
while some presumably is shifted from high-tax foreign jurisdictions); see also Kimberly A. 
Clausing, The Revenue Effects of Multinational Firm Income Shifting, 130 Tax Notes 
1580, 1581–82 figs.1 & 2 (2011) (documenting the gap between where U.S. multinationals 
report income (e.g., Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Bermuda, etc.) and where they 
have employees (e.g., U.K., Canada, Mexico, China)); Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and 
the Growing Share of U.S. Multinational Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are 
Being Globalized, 65 Nat’l Tax J. 247, 257–58 (2012) (noting that many profitable U.S. 
multinationals have a high percentage of sales in the United States, but a much lower 
percentage of their taxable income is earned there). Compared with shifting income from 
the United States, foreign-to-foreign shifting has somewhat different normative 
implications, since it arguably increases the (residual) tax collected by the United States. 
See Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? 
A Review of the Empirical Literature, 35 Fiscal Stud. 421, 423 (2014) (noting that a 10% 
differential in tax rates between affiliates induces an 8% increase in the low-tax affiliate’s 
reported income). 
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ing behavior in a variety of ways.62 Managers and advisors invest 
significant time in shifting income.63 In addition, U.S. multinationals 
keep over $2 trillion of foreign earnings offshore.64 To invest it in the 
United States, they have to pay a 35% repatriation tax or use costly plan-
ning to bring it back another way.65 
Yet although high corporate taxes encourage firms to shift income 
abroad, high shareholder taxes do not. They are immune to this dist-
ortion because, as noted above, the geographic boundary of shareholder 
taxes is based on where the shareholder lives, not where the firm earns its 
income.66 As a result, shareholders cannot avoid this tax by sourcing 
income abroad. For example, if a U.S. citizen receives a dividend from a 
foreign corporation, U.S. shareholder tax is due for this dividend, reg-
ardless of whether the firm earned this profit abroad or in the United 
States. 
This difference between corporate and shareholder taxes has be-
come much more important in recent years. It did not loom as large, for 
instance, when the Treasury and the American Law Institute (ALI) 
published studies on corporate integration two decades ago.67 At the 
                                                                                                                           
 61. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in 
the United States and Beyond, 69 Nat’l Tax J. (forthcoming Dec. 2016) (manuscript at 2), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2685442 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (estimating 
revenue loss between $77 and $111 billion). 
 62. Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and 
Corporate Profits, 28 J. Econ. Persp. 121, 130 (2014) (“I conclude that profit-shifting to 
low-tax jurisdictions reduces the tax bill of US-owned companies by about 20 percent.”). 
 63. Cf. Dhammika Dharmapala, The Economics of Corporate and Business Tax 
Reform 7 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
757, 2016) [hereinafter Dharmapala, The Economics of Corporate and Business Tax 
Reform], http://ssrn.com/abstract=2737444 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(noting the deadweight loss from the commitment of talent and effort to tax planning, 
instead of to a more socially valuable occupation). 
 64. Fortune 500 Companies Hold a Record $2.4 Trillion Offshore, Citizens for Tax 
Justice (Mar. 4, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://ctj.org/ctjreports/2016/03/fortune_500_
companies_hold_a_record_24_trillion_offshore.php#.V4jcN_krIdV [http://perma.cc/
TWG4-KSKS] (noting that earnings have been deemed “permanently reinvested”). 
 65. See Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of 
Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, 66 Nat’l Tax J. 671, 683–85 
(2013) [hereinafter Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System] (estimating the planning 
costs of bringing offshore earnings back to the United States to be 7%, based on analysis of 
the unexpectedly large response from multinationals when Congress temporarily reduced 
the repatriation tax to 3.6% in 2005); Melissa Redmiles, IRS, The One-Time Received 
Dividend Deduction, Stat. Income Bull., Spring 2008, at 102, 102–14 (showing that the 
stated rate was 5.25%, but a partial foreign tax credit was allowed, so the estimated average 
effective rate was 3.6%); Stephen E. Shay, The Truthiness of “Lockout”: A Review of What 
We Know, 146 Tax Notes 1393, 1395 (2015) (noting that firms generally can invest 
offshore earnings in stock and debt of other firms, but not in their own businesses). 
 66. See supra section I.A.3. 
 67. For example, in discussing international tax issues, the Treasury and ALI do not 
focus on income shifting. See Treasury, Integration Study, supra note 5, at 183–98; 
Warren, ALI Integration Report, supra note 24, at 735–63. In addition to these reports, 
1868 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:1849 
 
time, the economy was less global, foreign rates were higher, and some 
tax rules used in income shifting, such as the “check-the-box” rules, were 
not yet on the books.68 Perhaps for these reasons, the Treasury and ALI 
did not focus on the issue. Indeed, the Treasury proposed to rely on the 
corporate tax and to repeal the shareholder tax on dividends (and, to an 
extent, the capital gains tax as well).69 Although more plausible in 1992, 
this proposal is untenable today, as one of its principal architects has 
emphasized.70 
2. Inversions. — In addition to encouraging firms to shift income 
abroad, high corporate taxes induce another familiar distortion: Some 
firms respond by becoming a foreign firm, instead of a U.S. firm. Chang-
ing tax residence allows a firm to pay U.S. tax only on U.S. income, 
rather than on worldwide income.71 
                                                                                                                           
the Treasury also addressed integration in a report published in December 1992. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, A Recommendation for Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax 
Systems (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Treasury, Recommendation for Integration], 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-
Recommendation-Integration-1992.pdf [http://perma.cc/RTB4-YCQT]. 
 68. The “check-the-box” rules allow some types of entities to choose to be taxed 
either as corporations or pass-through entities. Joshua A. Kaplan, Check-the-Box Elections: 
Relevance in the International Context, Taxes Without Borders (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.taxeswithoutbordersblog.com/2014/07/relevance-in-the-international-
context/ [http://perma.cc/2YSE-K9ZL]. As one commentator observed, “[o]ne of the 
most powerful tools in cross-border tax planning is the ability to make a ‘check-the-box’ 
election.” Id. 
 69. See Treasury, Recommendation for Integration, supra note 67, at 2–3 
(recommending a “dividend exclusion” prototype, which would tax profits at the 
corporate level but impose no shareholder tax on dividends). The proposal nominally 
preserved the capital gains tax, but scaled it back by allowing firms to adopt a “dividend 
reinvestment plan,” or “DRIP.” Without a DRIP, dividends would be taxed more favorably 
than retained earnings. Shareholders could receive a dividend tax-free, and if they used it 
to buy more shares, the shareholders would have basis in these new shares. The key to this 
increase in basis—and thus to a lower capital gains tax bill—was to receive and reinvest a 
dividend. In contrast, if the firm retained earnings, shareholders could not use these 
earnings to buy more shares and thus would not have additional basis. To eliminate this 
difference between dividends and retained earnings, a DRIP would allow shareholders to 
use retained earnings to increase the basis in their stock. In effect, the capital gains tax on 
retained earnings would be eliminated. See id. at 2 (“The effect will be to reduce the 
capital gains (or increase the capital losses) realized when shareholders sell their stock by 
an amount equal to the corporation’s retained previously-taxed earnings.”). 
 70. See Does the Tax System Support Economic Efficiency, Job Creation, and Broad-
Based Economic Growth?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 80 (2011) 
(statement of Michael J. Graetz, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School) [hereinafter 
Graetz Testimony] (“I will not insist . . . we were right when the Treasury report was 
issued, but even if we were right then, that policy is now wrong. It is far easier and, I 
believe now better tax policy, to collect income taxes from individual citizens and resident 
shareholders than from multinational[s] . . . .”). 
 71. Although U.S. firms are taxed on worldwide income, they can defer tax on their 
active foreign income by earning it through a subsidiary and keeping these earnings 
offshore. Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699, 713–14 (2011) (“In 
practice the U.S. tax rules do not operate, as many presentations suggest, as a ‘worldwide’ 
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Changing tax residence is not especially difficult for corporations. 
They have to reincorporate abroad or combine with a foreign firm. Yet 
their headquarters can remain in the United States, along with factories, 
researchers, and customers. They also can still be listed on a U.S. 
exchange.72 Admittedly, although changing tax residence for a cor-
poration is not hard, it is not entirely without cost. The firm has to pay an 
exit tax73 and also may alienate some customers and investors.74 Different 
corporate law rules apply, so the cost of capital could increase if investor 
protections are weakened. But these costs are unlikely to deter self-
interested managers, since they may benefit personally from having more 
discretion to pursue self-interested goals. Indeed, they can even blame 
the tax law for “forcing” them to weaken investor protections.75 
So although switching tax residence requires some changes in be-
havior—and thus involves distortions—these costs often are less than the 
tax savings, at least when the U.S. corporate rate is high. In response, 
Congress and the Treasury have tried to block this planning strategy with 
section 7874,76 as well as with repeated rounds of regulatory action.77 But 
                                                                                                                           
system of taxation, but rather as an ersatz variant on territorial systems, with hidden 
benefits and costs when compared to standard territorial regimes.”). 
 72. For a discussion of inversions, see generally Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions 
and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1650 (2015) (“In a 
typical inversion, a U.S. multinational corporation (‘MNC’) merges with a foreign 
company. The entity that ultimately emerges from this transactional cocoon is invariably 
incorporated abroad, yet typically remains listed in U.S. securities markets under the 
erstwhile domestic issuer’s name.”). 
 73. I.R.C. § 367 (2012). 
 74. For instance, in abandoning its plans to invert, Walgreens responded in part to 
consumer pressure. See Michael J. de la Merced & Alexandra Stevenson, Walgreens Said 
to Consider an [sic] Tax-Inversion-Free Merger with Alliance Boots, N.Y. Times: Dealbook 
(Aug. 5, 2014, 3:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/walgreen-is-said-to-
near-a-deal-to-buy-out-british-drugstore-chain-but-without-an-inversion/ (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 75. See David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on 
Managerial Agency Costs, in Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance 13 
(Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015) (ebook) [hereinafter Schizer, Tax and 
Governance] (“[U.S.] tax rules offer a reason (or excuse) to incorporate in jurisdictions 
with weaker legal constraints on managerial agency costs.”). This erosion of shareholder 
protections should not be overstated, moreover, since protections can be included in the 
firm’s charter, and some also are guaranteed by federal securities law (which still applies 
to foreign firms, as long as they are listed in the United States). See Talley, supra note 72, 
at 1693–94. 
 76. I.R.C. § 7874. Section 7874 denies the tax benefits of an inversion—treating the 
inverted firm as still a U.S. firm for some purposes—if the inversion fails the statutory test, 
which focuses on where the inverted firm’s business assets are located and how much of 
the inverted firm is owned by shareholders who were owners of the pre-inversion domestic 
corporation. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775 (announcing the intention to 
issue additional regulations targeting inversion structures and post-inversion planning 
techniques); I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712 (announcing the intention to issue 
regulations targeting inversions); see also T.D. 9761, 2016-20 I.R.B. 746 (issuing temporary 
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although these steps raise the cost of this planning strategy, they have not 
stopped it entirely.78 For instance, firms can still combine with foreign 
firms that are sufficiently large.79 Firms also can incorporate abroad ini-
tially when they first go into business. 
While high corporate taxes induce these distortions, high share-
holder taxes are less likely to do so. Admittedly, shareholders enjoy tax 
advantages in changing tax residence, which roughly parallel those for 
corporations. Although shareholders still owe U.S. shareholder tax on 
dividends from U.S. firms, they no longer owe shareholder tax on 
dividends from foreign firms or, for that matter, on capital gains. Yet 
although changing residence can offer tax savings to both firms and 
shareholders, this step is much costlier for shareholders. In addition to 
owing an “exit” tax,80 shareholders have to renounce U.S. citizenship, 
leave the United States, and forgo the right to come back.81 These are 
major life changes, which are much more daunting than the relatively 
minor implications of changing a corporation’s residence. As a result, 
changing tax residence is a distortion that is more likely with high 
corporate taxes than with high shareholder taxes. 
3. Debt. — Along with encouraging firms to shift income and change 
their tax residence, high corporate taxes prompt another familiar planning 
strategy: Firms issue more debt. Since interest is deductible, corporations 
pay no tax on revenue that funds interest payments. Only lenders pay the 
                                                                                                                           
regulations to implement proposals described in Notices 2014-52 and 2015-79 and 
proposing regulations to recharacterize certain intercompany debt as equity). 
 78. In announcing new regulations in April of 2016, Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew 
said: “[W]e know companies will continue to seek new and creative ways to relocate their 
tax residence to avoid paying taxes here at home.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Treasury Announces Additional Action to Curb Inversions, Address Earnings 
Stripping (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl0405.aspx [http://perma.cc/YBW8-B7N9]. Secretary Lew added that regulations alone 
will not be enough and “urge[d] Congress to move forward with anti-inversion legislation 
this year.” Id.  
 79. U.S. shareholders should own less than 80% (or, for some purposes, 60%) of the 
combined firm. I.R.C. § 7874. 
 80. The tax applies to built-in gains above $600,000 for taxpayers with $2 million in 
assets or average income of at least $160,000 over the past five years. Id. § 877(a) (requir-
ing taxpayers with income or assets above specified levels to pay expatriation tax); id. 
§ 877A(a)(3) (providing $600,000 exclusion, which is adjusted for inflation); Expatriation 
Tax, Internal Revenue Serv. (May 13, 2016), http://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/expatriation-tax [http://perma.cc/3GAS-BB5G] (noting that income must be 
above $160,000 in 2015 in order for the tax to apply). 
 81. During the ten-year period after they expatriate, former citizens also cannot 
spend more than thirty days per year in the United States, or they are taxed as U.S. citizens 
on their worldwide income. I.R.C. § 877(g). In theory, former citizens can even be barred 
from short visits, since Congress has authorized the Justice Department to deny reentry to 
those who expatriate for tax reasons. See Mark Nestmann, “Homelanders” to U.S. 
Expatriates: Don’t Come Back . . . Ever, Nestmann Grp. (June 23, 2013), http://
www.nestmann.com/homelanders-to-u-s-expatriates-dont-come-back-ever#.V44SC_krIdU 
[http://perma.cc/9BMD-ESE6]. 
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tax, which they avoid if they are tax exempt or foreign.82 When debt 
finances favorably taxed assets (e.g., those that are eligible for 
accelerated depreciation), the effective tax rate can be negative.83 
In addition to reducing revenue, the tax preference for debt causes 
familiar taxpayer responses. On the positive side of the ledger, debt 
imposes discipline on managers. If a firm has no debt, managers can 
choose what to do with the firm’s cash, so they are freer to use it in self-
interested ways. But once the firm has debt, managers have less 
discretion, since they have to pay interest. To avoid this constraint, self-
interested managers may shy away from issuing debt, so the tax 
preference for debt plays a useful role in countering this impulse.84 
Yet on the negative side of the ledger, debt increases the risk of 
bankruptcy, which is a costly process. As a result, a tax preference for debt 
is likely to increase bankruptcy costs.85 Alternatively, it can induce costly 
financial innovation, as hybrid securities are developed that offer a tax 
deduction but do not increase bankruptcy risk as much.86 When firms 
respond by taking on more insolvency risk, the tax preference for debt 
can cause another distortion as well: Managers have the incentive to take 
unwise risks when firms are on the brink of insolvency. Even if a risky 
initiative is unlikely to pay off, managers “swing for the fences” because 
they personally share in gains (by avoiding the reputational cost of bank-
ruptcy) but can shift losses to creditors (by reducing their recovery in 
bankruptcy).87 
4. Corporate Lock-In. — The high corporate tax distorts managerial 
behavior in another familiar way: Managers hesitate to sell appreciated 
assets, since selling them triggers corporate tax on the appreciation.88 If 
                                                                                                                           
 82. See infra sections I.C.4–.5. 
 83. See Cong. Budget Office, Taxing Capital Income: Effective Rates and Approaches 
to Reform 8 (Oct. 2005), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-
2006/reports/10-18-tax.pdf [http://perma.cc/4QAK-GLQF] (finding that debt-financed 
corporate investments have an effective tax rate of -6.4%). Intercompany debt is also a 
familiar way to shift income: When high-tax affiliates borrow from low-tax affiliates, 
interest payments can shift income to the low-tax jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay,  
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Treasury’s Unfinished Work on Corporate 
Expatriations, 150 Tax Notes 933, 933–34 (2016) (discussing regulatory responses to 
impede earnings stripping by inverted companies). 
 84. See Schizer, Tax and Governance, supra note 75, at 9. 
 85. The consensus estimate is that cutting the corporate rate by 10% would reduce 
the debt-to-asset ratio by 2.8%. See Ruud A. De Mooij, Tax Biases to Debt Finance: 
Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, 33 Fiscal Stud. 489, 495 (2012). The bankruptcy 
costs associated with tax-induced leverage are estimated to be approximately 1% of 
corporate tax revenue. See Roger H. Gordon, Taxation and the Corporate Use of Debt: 
Implications for Tax Policy, 63 Nat’l Tax J. 151, 152–53 (2010). 
 86. See Schizer, Tax and Governance, supra note 75, at 9. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Under the realization rule, tax on an appreciated asset is not due until it is sold. 
See David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1549, 1551 (1998) 
[hereinafter Schizer, Realization as Subsidy]. 
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the tax is high enough, managers keep unwanted business units, intel-
lectual property, and passive investments. Although managers are sup-
posed to allocate scarce capital to the most promising opportunities, this 
“lock-in” effect impedes this process by favoring appreciated assets that 
the firm already owns. 
In some cases, managers can use planning strategies to avoid lock-in. 
In effect, they dispose of appreciated assets tax-free, for instance, with 
spinoffs or derivative transactions.89 When these strategies are available, 
lock-in no longer impedes the efficient allocation of a firm’s assets. Yet 
these strategies cause other distortions instead. In addition to paying 
advisory fees, the firm has to comply with a host of technical require-
ments, which can affect the structure and economic return.90 
While high corporate taxes encourage firms to hold onto appre-
ciated assets, high shareholder taxes do not; instead, high shareholder 
taxes induce a different form of lock-in by encouraging shareholders to 
keep appreciated stock. These dueling lock-in effects are a quintessential 
example of why shifting tax from corporations to shareholders alleviates 
some distortions, while exacerbating others. For example, suppose a cor-
poration has appreciated assets while the firm’s shareholders have 
appreciated stock. Both the corporation and its shareholders have a tax 
incentive not to sell. Cutting the corporate rate mitigates the cor-
poration’s lock-in. But if this cut is funded by increasing the shareholder 
rate, shareholder lock-in is exacerbated. 
5. Comparative Advantage of Corporations over Shareholders in Tax 
Planning. — Another challenge in collecting tax from corporations, inst-
ead of from shareholders, is that corporations enjoy greater economies 
of scale in tax planning than do shareholders. When firms incur advisory 
fees and other structuring costs, all shareholders share in these costs. In 
contrast, individual shareholders cannot pool costs in the same way.91 
Admittedly, this difference should not be overstated, since corp-
orations do not always use their comparative advantage. Managers can be 
wary of tax planning, since they bear reputational costs when strategies 
fail but share tax savings with shareholders when strategies succeed. Even 
so, there are familiar ways to mitigate these agency costs, including legal 
opinions to protect managers’ reputations, as well as bonuses for 
lowering the firm’s effective tax rate.92 
                                                                                                                           
 89. See Schizer, Frictions, supra note 48, at 1345–47 (describing how derivatives are 
used to hedge appreciated stock). 
 90. See id. at 1345–59 (describing frictions that impede hedging or make it costlier). 
 91. Of course, shareholders have advisors that may be able to spread costs among cli-
ents, such as investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers. But these advisors probably are 
better positioned to spread the costs of developing strategies than of implementing them. 
 92. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal 
Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in 3 MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, 
Competition and Tax Law: Tax and Corporate Governance 229, 242 (Wolfgang Schön ed., 
2008) (“[A]voiding penalties may depend . . . on whether the taxpayer can demonstrate 
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When managers are motivated to engage in tax planning, they focus 
on corporate taxes instead of on shareholder taxes. Corporate taxes are 
more likely to affect standard metrics of their performance, such as 
reported earnings.93 Managers also have less control over shareholder 
taxes, which often turn on shareholder choices (e.g., about when to sell) 
and vary with each shareholder’s tax bracket.94 
6. Incidence. — A further challenge with relying on the corporate tax 
is the uncertainty about who actually pays it. Obviously, the corporation 
writes the check. But does this payment reduce the investment return of 
shareholders, lower the salary of employees, or raise the price paid by 
consumers? If the goal of taxing “rich” corporations is to tax high-
income investors—as voters often assume—this goal is not achieved if the 
burden actually falls on low-income workers. 
A key reason why corporate taxes may burden workers is income 
shifting. If firms respond by shifting real activity overseas, there is less 
capital in the United States, reducing the productivity and wages of U.S. 
workers.95 Yet this effect will not necessarily arise if firms shift income 
with planning, instead of moving real activity.96 Shifting income also is 
not a viable strategy—so incidence is not likely to be on workers—when 
U.S. firms earn rents, are not capital intensive, or cannot easily rely on 
foreign production. Therefore, it is unclear how much of the corporate 
tax is borne by investors, as opposed to workers. 
Does the same issue arise with a shareholder tax? Although gen-
eralizations are hard, there is a reason why shifting the corporate tax to 
                                                                                                                           
reliance on a sufficiently sanguine opinion of counsel. Tax lawyers therefore have at least a 
limited power to grant penalty protection.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax 56 
(Brookings Inst., Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2007-09, 2007), http://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200706kleinbard.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8H2E-BPVT] (positing that for agency-cost reasons “investor tax consequences will not 
materially affect managers’ business decision making”). Of course, if accounting for 
shareholder taxes reduces a firm’s cost of capital, this savings could influence metrics that 
matter to managers. 
 94. Even so, when deciding whether to pay dividends or repurchase shares, managers 
do have influence on shareholder taxes, and there is some evidence that they consider 
them. See, e.g., Jennifer Blouin, Jana Raedy & Douglas Shackelford, Dividends, Share 
Repurchases, and Tax Clienteles: Evidence from the 2003 Reductions in Shareholder 
Taxes 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16129, 2010), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w16129.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing firms 
repurchased fewer shares after the rates for dividends and capital gains were aligned in 
2003). 
 95. Since high corporate rates are more likely to trigger shifting than low rates, a low 
corporate tax presumably is more likely to burden investors than a high tax. 
 96. Kimberly A. Clausing, Who Pays the Corporate Tax in a Global Economy?, 66 
Nat’l Tax J. 151, 171 (2013) (“If firms can respond to tax differences among countries 
through financial or organizational decisions, this will lower the tax sensitivity of real 
activity, thus reducing adverse effects on labor associated from tax-induced reductions in 
the capital stock.”). 
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workers could be easier than shifting the shareholder tax: If workers 
refuse to take a pay cut, managers can avoid this expense by moving the 
business offshore, which is costly to workers. “If you will not absorb this 
cost for us,” managers can say, “we will move our operations out of the 
United States, and you will lose your jobs.” But unlike the corporate tax, 
the shareholder tax cannot be avoided by moving the business offshore. 
As noted above, U.S. shareholders are still taxed on dividends and capital 
gains, even if the underlying profit is earned abroad.97 Since this tax 
cannot be avoided another way—which is even more costly to workers—
employees are under less pressure to accept lower pay. For this reason, 
the incidence of corporate and shareholder taxes could be different. Yet 
even so, it is hard to know whether this is actually the case. 
7. Tailoring the Tax Burden to Individual Circumstances. — Finally, 
another limitation of corporate taxes is that, unlike shareholder taxes, 
they use a rate that does not account for the other income of share-
holders (or others who bear the tax’s economic burden).98 The brackets 
of a corporate tax are based on the income of the firm, not the income 
of shareholders (or other stakeholders).99 So if a corporation earns 
enough to be in the top bracket, the same (top) corporate rate applies 
(indirectly) to all shareholders (and other stakeholders). Retirees with 
low incomes are treated the same as the CEO.100 
This blunt approach creates familiar efficiency and distributional 
concerns. Corporations are treated differently than pass-through busi-
nesses, whose owners are taxed at their personal rate, which accounts for 
other income.101 This discontinuity can distort behavior.102 In addition, 
using a rate that fails to account for other income is a flawed way to pur-
sue distributional goals. 
                                                                                                                           
 97. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2012); see also supra section I.B.1. 
 98. See supra section I.B.6. 
 99. I.R.C. § 11. 
 100. Although individual tailoring is not feasible if Congress relies solely on the corporate 
tax, it is feasible if Congress relies only partially on it. Congress can impose a flat tax at the 
corporate level, while also collecting a shareholder tax that varies with the shareholder’s 
income. Professor George Yin proposed this approach, describing the shareholder tax as a 
“surtax.” See George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic 
Ideal, 47 Tax L. Rev. 431, 481–83 (1992). For instance, the corporate tax can be a flat 22.5% 
tax, while the shareholder tax can vary between 0% and 22.5%, depending on the 
shareholder’s income. 
 101. I.R.C. § 701 (“A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax 
imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for in-
come tax only in their separate or individual capacities.”). 
 102. These issues featured prominently in the ALI’s recommendation to use an 
imputation system, which applies the shareholder’s individual rate to dividend income. 
See Warren, ALI Integration Report, supra note 24, at 618–22, 631–35. 
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C. High Shareholder Taxes: Planning Strategies and Other Challenges 
To show why the allocation between corporate and shareholder 
taxes is important—even when rates are coordinated to produce a 
specific combined rate (e.g., 40%)—the last section showed that a high 
corporate tax motivates a range of planning strategies.103 For instance, if 
the corporate tax is 40% and the shareholder tax is 0%, corporations are 
likely to respond by shifting income abroad, changing their tax resi-
dence, issuing more debt, and delaying the sale of appreciated assets. 
In response, these planning strategies can be preempted by cutting 
(or even repealing) the corporate tax. Since taxpayers are less motivated 
to avoid a low tax, they would have less reason to invest in these strategies 
or to change their behavior in other ways. But unfortunately, this pro-
gress is not free. If the cut in the corporate tax is funded with an increase 
in the shareholder tax—so the corporate tax is 0% and the shareholder 
tax is 40%—taxpayers have a correspondingly stronger incentive to avoid 
shareholder taxes. Instead of using the strategies discussed above, they 
would use other strategies to avoid the shareholder tax. This section can-
vasses planning strategies that are appealing when shareholder rates are 
high and corporate rates are low. The bottom line is that changing the 
mix of rates eases one set of distortions but exacerbates another. 
1. Shareholder Lock-In. — A familiar challenge with relying on 
shareholder taxes, instead of on corporate taxes, is that shareholders 
control the timing of an important component: the tax on share 
appreciation. Unlike corporate income, which is taxed every year, share 
appreciation is taxed only when stock is sold.104 By discouraging sales, a 
capital gains tax “locks in” shareholders, distorting portfolio choices and 
encouraging costly hedging transactions. Not only can this tax be 
delayed, but sometimes it can also be avoided entirely: Shareholders are 
never taxed on capital gain if they hold appreciated stock until they die105 
or contribute it to charity.106 Obviously, these strategies become more 
                                                                                                                           
 103. See supra section I.B. 
 104. See, e.g., Tim Dowd, Robert McClelland & Athiphat Muthitacharoen, New 
Evidence on the Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains, 68 Nat’l Tax J. 511, 513–14 (2015) 
[hereinafter Dowd et al., New Evidence on Tax Elasticity] (showing the significant effect 
of capital gains tax on realizations). 
 105. For instance, if a taxpayer buys stock for $1 per share and dies when it is valued at 
$100 per share, the taxpayer’s heir’s basis is $100, not $1. See I.R.C. § 1014 (providing that 
the basis of property acquired from a decedent is “the fair market value of the property at 
the date of the decedent’s death”). The reason is that heirs can “step up” the basis of 
inherited property to its fair market value when they inherit it. If the heir immediately sells 
the shares for $100, there is no taxable gain. In other words, no tax is ever collected on the 
$99 of appreciation that occurred during the taxpayer’s lifetime. 
 106. For example, if a taxpayer buys stock for $1 per share, and contributes it to 
charity when it is worth $100 per share, this contribution is not taxed as a sale. Since the 
charity is tax exempt, it can sell it immediately for no gain. At the same time, the taxpayer 
can still deduct the stock’s fair market value ($100 per share), instead of the stock’s basis 
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appealing when the shareholder rate increases.107 So if the shareholder 
tax is raised in order to fund a cut in the corporate tax, more 
shareholders will use these strategies to delay or avoid the capital gains 
tax. 
2. Trapped Earnings. — Like the tax on share appreciation, the tax 
on dividends can also be delayed. This tax is not due until a dividend is 
actually paid.108 At first blush, delaying the dividend tax may seem 
advantageous, but delaying this tax actually does not reduce its present 
value (as long as the rate does not change).109 
Even so, there is a different tax reason to delay a dividend, which is 
not prompted by a high shareholder rate, but by a low corporate rate. 
When the corporate rate is low, firms have a comparative advantage over 
shareholders in investing money.110 For instance, assume the shareholder 
rate is 40%, the corporate rate is 0%, and the personal rate is 40% (i.e., 
on pass-through businesses, rents, interest, etc.). Because the corporate 
rate is 0%, investments grow tax-free inside a corporation. But if the firm 
distributes earnings, and shareholders do not reinvest them in a corp-
oration, the shareholders’ investments generally are taxed at the 40% 
personal rate.111 So if the pretax return is the same, the investment grows 
faster inside a corporation. As a result, corporations function like a tax-
advantaged account when the corporate rate is lower than the personal 
rate.112 This tax advantage of corporations was widely used when corpo-
                                                                                                                           
($1 per share), if the taxpayer holds it for more than a year. See id. § 170. As a result, the 
$99 of appreciation is never taxed. 
 107. Empirical estimates suggest that taxpayers are quite sensitive to tax rates in 
deciding how much gain to realize. See, e.g., Dowd et al., New Evidence on Tax Elasticity, 
supra note 104, at 527 (estimating elasticity of persistent tax changes to be about -0.72, 
with transitory elasticity above 1). 
 108. I.R.C. § 301(c) (including dividend in income). 
 109. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax 37 (2009) [hereinafter 
Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax] (“Ordinarily in income tax planning, 
deferral . . . is a good thing . . . . In the corporate distributions setting, . . . things are more 
complicated because the amount that ultimately will have to be distributed . . . is growing 
by reason of the positive return to the funds the company is keeping on hand in the 
interim.”). 
 110. See Daniel I. Halperin, Mitigating the Potential Inequity of Reducing Corporate 
Rates, 126 Tax Notes 641, 648 (2010) [hereinafter Halperin, Mitigating Inequity] (“[I]f 
distributions are taxed and the combined rate is equal to the individual rate, there is no 
advantage from the deferral of the tax on the initial corporate earnings. The advantage is 
the higher return on reinvested earnings.”). 
 111. For instance, periodic income from pass-through businesses, loans, and rental 
property would generally be taxed at the personal rate. See I.R.C. § 61. However, capital 
gain from selling investments would generally be taxed at the capital gains rate. See id. 
§ 1(h). 
 112. For instance, assume a firm can either distribute $100 of profit to shareholders or 
retain it for three years and then distribute it. Assume the annual pretax return during 
those three years is 10% either way, and that the personal rate is 40%, the corporate rate is 
0%, and the shareholder rate is 40%. If the firm keeps these earnings for three years, it can 
earn a 10% after-tax return (since the 0% corporate rate applies). But if the firm 
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rate rates were significantly lower than personal rates.113 Although this 
planning receded when this gap narrowed in 1981, it would revive if the 
gap were to widen.114 
Unfortunately, this tax preference for retained earnings is likely to 
exacerbate agency costs. Retained earnings are problematic because 
managers have unfettered discretion to spend them. In contrast, if profits 
are distributed to shareholders, managers no longer have capital on 
hand. To pursue new initiatives, they have to persuade investors to write a 
check. The need to make a case disciplines managers, discouraging them 
from proposing self-interested uses of capital.115 Since leaving cash in the 
corporation undermines this discipline, tax rules that encourage firms to 
keep cash breed agency costs.116 This is a problem not only with favoring 
retained earnings, but also with collecting tax from shareholders instead 
of corporations: If the check comes from shareholders, the corporation 
keeps more of its cash, leaving managers in control of more resources. 
Shareholder taxes can also affect corporate cash flow in another way. 
Taxing dividends creates a timing mismatch for shareholders whose stock 
has not appreciated: Current income from the dividend is offset by 
future capital loss when they sell stock.117 One way to avoid this mis-
match, emphasized by Professor David Weisbach, is to accelerate divi-
dends, paying them before stock is sold to a new owner with shares that 
have not appreciated.118 Conversely, another solution is to delay divi-
                                                                                                                           
distributes the earnings immediately, the shareholder can earn only a 6% return (since the 
40% personal rate applies). At the end of three years, the shareholder has $79.86 if the 
corporation retains these earnings, compared with $71.46 if the corporation had dist-
ributed them immediately. 
 113. See Halperin, Mitigating Inequity, supra note 110, at 642. 
 114. Cf. id. (“[I]f the corporate rate is lower than the top individual rate—a dynamic 
that has not been in place since 1986—closely held businesses might again choose to be 
subject to the corporate tax to shelter high-income individuals from high individual 
rates.”). Indeed, if Congress wants to use the same rate for noncorporate and corporate 
businesses—so the corporate and shareholder rates aggregate to the personal rate—the 
corporate rate has to be lower than the personal rate, as long as at least some tax is 
collected from shareholders (and the timing of these taxes varies). Specifically, if (1–P) = 
(1–C) (1–S), and S>0, C has to be less than P. 
 115. See Schizer, Tax and Governance, supra note 75, at 10. 
 116. Conversely, when corporate rates are higher than personal rates, there is a tax 
incentive to distribute earnings, which could keep firms from pursuing valuable projects 
(e.g., if outside investors will not fund them because of asymmetric information). 
 117. For example, assume a shareholder buys stock for $100 and immediately receives 
a $5 dividend, which reduces the stock price to $95. The shareholder has five dollars of 
taxable dividend income, but no economic profit. As a result, this current income is offset 
by five dollars of future capital loss, which is not deductible until the stock is sold. 
 118. David Weisbach, Capital Gains Taxation and Corporate Investment 16 (Univ. of 
Chi. Law Sch., Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 740, 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2721798 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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dends until shares appreciate. Still another (partial) fix is to cut divi-
dends, so the magnitude of this mismatch is reduced.119 
3. Salary Shifting. — When the shareholder rate is high—or, to be 
precise, when the corporate rate is low—another planning strategy 
becomes appealing: Owners who are also employees pay themselves 
below-market salaries. This strategy is appealing when the personal rate 
(which governs salaries) is higher than the corporate rate. To implement 
this strategy, employee-owners leave money inside the corporation, 
instead of taking it out as salary. There is not much economic sig-
nificance to leaving money in the corporation, since the employee-owner 
owns and controls it. But the tax treatment changes: (High-taxed) salary 
is transformed into (low-taxed) corporate earnings.120 
This “salary shifting” loses its appeal if the corporate rate is 
increased to match the personal rate. But unfortunately, raising the cor-
porate rate exacerbates income and residence shifting, as well as the 
other problems discussed in section I.B. In theory, to avoid all of these 
distortions, the U.S. corporate rate has to equal both the U.S. personal 
rate (to deter salary shifting) and foreign corporate rates (to deter 
income and residence shifting). But this solution is mathematically 
impossible under current law, since the U.S. personal rate is significantly 
higher than foreign corporate rates. So once again, we have to pick our 
poison.121 
4. Tax-Exempt Shareholders. — Another familiar problem with 
shareholder taxes is that, unlike corporate taxes, they do not reach tax-
exempt shareholders.122 For instance, assume that tax-exempt share-
holders own a for-profit corporation, which earns $100 million. If the 
corporate tax is 40% and the shareholder tax is 0%, $40 million of tax is 
                                                                                                                           
 119. The scope of the mismatch increases when dividends are large, and also when 
shareholder taxes are high; either one increases the size of the initial income inclusion, 
which is offset by a deferred capital loss. 
 120. For example, assume that an entrepreneur is the sole owner and employee of a 
corporation, which earns $500,000, and assume also that the personal rate is 40%, the 
corporate rate is 20%, and the shareholder rate is 25%. If the entrepreneur takes all the 
corporation’s $500,000 of revenue as salary, the entrepreneur pays a 40% tax (of 
$200,000). Since the corporation deducts this salary payment, it has no taxable income. As 
a result, all the business’s economic return is taxed as salary (at the higher personal rate), 
and none is taxed as corporate profit (at the lower corporate rate). But this changes if the 
entrepreneur takes only a $100,000 salary (taxable at 40%), leaving the firm with a 
$400,000 profit (taxable at 20%). Instead of a current tax of $200,000, the government 
receives a current tax of only $120,000 (i.e., $40,000 on the salary and $80,000 on the 
corporate profit). In other words, the entrepreneur turns $400,000 of (high-taxed) salary 
into (low-taxed) corporate profit. Obviously, an additional 25% shareholder tax would be 
imposed if the firm distributes its profit to the owner. 
 121. See Dharmapala, The Economics of Corporate and Business Tax Reform, supra 
note 63, at 14 (“[T]he corporate tax rate is a single instrument that affects two very 
different kinds of behavior—the incorporation decisions of (typically small) business ent-
ities or individuals, and the location and investment decisions of large MNCs.”). 
 122. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012). 
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collected. But if these rates are flipped—so the corporate rate is 0% and 
the shareholder rate is 40%—no tax is collected. 
This gap in investor-level taxes is already an issue for debt. Under 
current law, tax-exempt lenders pay no tax on interest, but corporations 
can still deduct it.123 As a result, the United States collects no tax on 
revenue servicing this debt. This hole in the tax base would grow if equity 
were also taxed only (or primarily) at the investor level. Significant rev-
enue is at stake, since less than half of U.S. equities are held by taxable 
U.S. shareholders; tax-exempt and foreign shareholders own the rest.124 
This gap in shareholder taxes complicates any effort to fund a corporate 
tax cut with them. 
Obviously, the treatment of tax exempts does not have to be binary. 
Instead of paying a full tax or no tax at all, they could pay an inter-
mediate amount, as with the (indirect) corporate tax under current law. 
How much they pay should depend, at least in part, on the reasons for 
exempting them. Since the rationales vary with the type of tax exempt, 
the tax could vary too. For example, individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs) encourage savings, especially for low-income people. So do pen-
sion funds, although distribution features less prominently (since there 
are no income limits). 
By contrast, exempting investment income of universities, religious 
organizations, and cultural institutions is supposed to promote their 
charitable missions. But another tax preference—the charitable deduc-
tion—also advances this goal and is arguably more effective. The deduc-
tion rewards charities for attracting support from donors; government 
money flows only if donors are willing to contribute their own money 
and thus have “skin in the game.”125 In contrast, exempting investment 
                                                                                                                           
 123. See id. § 163(a) (authorizing deduction for interest); id. § 501(a) (exempting 
income of nonprofits). 
 124. See Jane G. Gravelle & Donald J. Marples, Cong. Research Serv., R44242, The 
Effect of Base-Broadening Measures on Labor Supply and Investment: Considerations for 
Tax Reform 27 (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44242.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2ANX-G4NZ] (estimating that 25% of dividends are paid to taxable accounts); 
Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. Corporate 
Stock, 151 Tax Notes 923, 923 (2016) (estimating that household accounts held only 
24.2% of U.S. equities in 2015); Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review 
of What We Know 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11686, 2005), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11686.pdf [http://perma.cc/5CV5-MMW9] (estimating 
that less than half of corporate equities are owned by households). 
 125. By offering a deduction, the government allows donors to use charitable 
contributions to reduce their tax bills. See I.R.C. § 170. For instance, if a donor’s personal 
tax rate is 40%, and the donor contributes $1 million, this contribution can reduce her tax 
bill by $400,000 (by reducing her taxable income by $1 million and thus reducing her 
taxes by $400,000). With this $1 million contribution, then, the donor is putting in 
$600,000 of her own money and attracting a $400,000 matching contribution from the 
government (in the form of a reduced tax bill). Therefore, the government’s $400,000 of 
support becomes available only if the donor is willing to put in $600,000 of her own 
money. 
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income rewards charities for running a surplus and investing it 
successfully, which is a less reliable signal of social value.126 In fact, non-
profits with investment income are under less pressure to raise new 
money. They have less need to demonstrate continuing value to donors, 
especially when investment income is tax-free and thus covers more of 
their budgets. As a result, the deduction arguably promotes positive 
externalities more effectively than the exemption does. Yet even if these 
rules are equally effective, charity can still be subsidized without the 
exemption, as long as the deduction is available. A cut in one can be 
offset with enhancements to the other. 
5. Foreigner Shareholders. — Like tax exempts, foreigners are taxed 
indirectly by the corporate tax, but (largely) escape shareholder taxes.127 
So if shareholder taxes are increased to fund a cut in corporate taxes, for-
eign shareholders would mostly be exempt from this increased share-
holder tax. Under current law, foreigners pay no tax on capital gains.128 
Although foreigners’ dividends are subject to withholding, treaties often 
reduce the rate of the withholding tax that applies to these dividends 
(e.g., from 30% to 15%).129 So if foreigners own a U.S. corporation that 
earns $100 million, $40 million of tax is collected with a 40% corporate 
tax and a 0% shareholder tax. But no tax is collected if these rates are 
reversed, as long as shareholders earn capital gains instead of dividends. 
Like tax exempts, foreigners already avoid both corporate and investor 
taxes in lending to corporations. This gap would grow if equity were also 
taxed only (or primarily) at the investor level. 
A key question, then, is how much tax foreigners should pay. Taxing 
them enhances national welfare in three ways. First, it keeps resources in 
the U.S. economy.130 Second, revenue targets can be met with a lower 
(and less distortive) tax on U.S. firms and shareholders. Third, taxing 
foreign owners of corporate businesses matches the treatment of non-
                                                                                                                           
 126. For a discussion, see David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charity: Donations, 
Investment Income, and the Governance of Nonprofits 21 (Oct. 14, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 127. The assumption here is that these foreigners do not live in the United States; if 
they do, they are taxed like U.S. citizens. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 871(a)(2) (stipulating that the 
capital gains of foreigners be taxed if they satisfy the residency test). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. Foreigners used to avoid even this reduced withholding by investing in 
derivatives. Although a reform, section 871(m), was supposed to plug this gap, questions 
remain about its effectiveness. Id. § 871(m); see also Thomas J. Brennan & Robert L. 
McDonald, The Problematic Delta Test for Dividend Equivalents, 146 Tax Notes 525, 529 
(2015) (discussing various ways that taxpayers could avoid withholding tax by 
manipulating the delta test). For a discussion of these regulations, see Tax Section, N.Y. 
State Bar Ass’n, Report No. 1340, Report on Regulations Under Section 871(m) (Mar. 28, 
2016), http://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2016/ 
Tax_Section_Report_1340.html [http://perma.cc/H3AD-4GMM]. 
 130. For instance, if foreign owners of a U.S. corporation would otherwise receive 
$100 of corporate profits, a 40% tax on the corporation keeps $40 in the United States. 
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corporate businesses, whose foreign owners already pay tax on U.S. pro-
fits. (The politics are tempting as well, since foreign investors do not vote 
in the United States.) 
Even so, taxing foreign investors has two offsetting costs. First, the 
United States might attract less foreign investment. Yet a zero rate seems 
like an overreaction, even though the United States exempts interest for 
this reason. After all, investing in the United States is appealing,131 so for-
eigners presumably will pay some tax to do so. Second, if the United 
States raises taxes on foreigners, other jurisdictions might reciprocate 
with higher taxes on U.S. investors. If Americans claim more foreign tax 
credits, the United States might not raise (net) revenue. 
So far, the focus has been on revenue losses when a corporate tax 
cut is funded with higher shareholder taxes: Less revenue is collected 
from foreign and tax-exempt shareholders of U.S. corporations. How-
ever, these rate changes offer offsetting revenue gains as well: More is 
collected when U.S. shareholders invest in foreign firms that earn money 
abroad.132 The corporate tax does not reach foreign profits of foreign 
firms, but the shareholder tax does. Therefore, cutting the corporate rate 
and raising the shareholder rate collects more tax on these profits. 
6. Administrative Costs. — In addition to the revenue losses from 
exempt and foreign shareholders, another challenge in taxing share-
holders, instead of corporations, is the loss of economies of scale in 
compliance and collection. Corporations can spread the cost of advice, 
record-keeping, and other infrastructure across all shareholders. For the 
government, monitoring the firm is more cost effective than policing 
(and suing) owners of small blocks of stock.133 Even so, these admin-
istrative advantages have become less compelling over time. Superior 
expertise has enabled corporations not only to comply with rules, but 
also to avoid them, as emphasized above.134 At the same time, third-party 
                                                                                                                           
 131. See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce & The President’s Council of Econ. Advisors, 
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 3 (Oct. 2013), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/2013fdi_report_-_final_for_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/24Q5-66CF] 
(“With the world’s largest consumer market, skilled and productive workers, a highly 
innovative environment, appropriate legal protections, a predictable regulatory 
environment, and a growing energy sector, the United States offers an attractive 
investment climate for firms across the globe.”). 
 132. See Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Shifting the Burden of Taxation from 
the Corporate to the Personal Level and Getting the Corporate Tax Rate Down to 15 
Percent, at 8 (Rutgers Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Departmental Working Paper No. 2015-06, 
2016) [hereinafter Grubert & Altshuler, Shifting the Burden], http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2802109 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[F]or proposals that include an 
increased tax on capital gains and dividends it would also be necessary to add U.S. resident 
holdings of foreign shares.”). 
 133. See Treasury, Integration Study, supra note 5, at 102 (noting that “tax is most 
likely to be collected if paid at the corporate level”). 
 134. See supra section I.B.5. 
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reporting of dividends and basis has helped the government monitor 
shareholder compliance more effectively.135 
7. Tax Expenditures. — Finally, another difference between corporate 
and shareholder taxes is that shareholder taxes have less influence on 
managers. In theory, since shareholder taxes affect a shareholder’s 
return, a manager should try to minimize them. But tax-exempt and 
foreign investors do not want managers to devote resources to these 
efforts—since these shareholders would not benefit—and shareholder 
taxes also have a less immediate impact on reported earnings.136 Since 
managers do not focus on shareholder taxes, tax expenditures have less 
influence on corporate behavior when included in shareholder taxes, 
instead of in corporate taxes. Of course, this is a disadvantage only if the 
relevant tax expenditures are good policy. If they are not, reducing their 
impact is actually an advantage.137 
II. BALANCING COMPONENT-RATE DISTORTIONS: ADVANTAGES OF 
 USING TWO TAXES 
Part I laid out key challenges in taxing corporations, on the one 
hand, and shareholders, on the other. Cutting one rate and raising the 
other fixes some problems while complicating others. What is the right 
response to these dueling distortions? Obviously, one answer is to fix the 
relevant rules, so they cannot be gamed. In theory, if all the holes in each 
tax were plugged, taxpayers would no longer be able to avoid either one. 
Each tax would measure income in the same (perfectly accurate) way. 
But although the rules can certainly be improved, and these improve-
ments should be an important priority, it is too optimistic to expect all 
                                                                                                                           
 135. Securities brokers have been required to report the cost basis of securities since 
2011. Third Party Reporting Information Center, Internal Revenue Serv., http://
www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/third-party-reporting-information-center [http://perma.cc/
AB8E-X54A] (last updated Mar. 17, 2016). Studies show that third-party reporting 
increases compliance. See, e.g., James Alm, John A. Deskins & Michael McKee, Third-Party 
Income Reporting and Income Tax Compliance 3–4 (Andrew Young Sch. of Policy 
Studies, Working Paper No. 06-35, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=895344 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (using experimental methods to show that third-party reporting 
increases compliance). 
 136. Halperin, Mitigating Inequity, supra note 110, at 645 (“[S]ince only the 
corporate tax affects reported corporate earnings and earnings per share, the 
shareholder’s tax burden on distributions may not affect corporate decision-making, 
except to the extent it raises the cost of capital.”). 
 137. Even then, a further issue in relying less on the corporate tax—so the gap 
between it and the personal rate widens—is that the same tax expenditure becomes more 
valuable for pass-through businesses (in avoiding the higher personal rate) than for 
corporate businesses (in avoiding the lower corporate rate). See Toder & Viard, A 
Proposal, supra note 3, at 19 (explaining that tax deductions are more valuable for flow-
through businesses). A solution is to use credits, instead of deductions, so corporations’ 
generosity does not depend on the tax rate. See id. (“The corporate tax rate reduction 
would not directly reduce the tax savings from claiming a credit, which depends on the 
credit rate rather than marginal tax rates.”). 
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these planning strategies to be foreclosed. The administrative and pol-
itical challenges are too formidable. Instead, it is more realistic to expect 
at least some gaps in each tax to endure. 
So if these dueling distortions are likely to be a perennial challenge, 
what is the right response? Since each tax has significant gaps, one 
option is to get rid of at least one of these porous taxes, and to do the 
best we can with the other. But as this Part explains, the opposite is act-
ually a better strategy. Instead of relying on one tax or the other, this 
Essay’s central recommendation is to use both. Although it may seem 
counterintuitive, the fact that each tax is flawed is all the more reason 
why both are needed. 
A. Value of Keeping Both Taxes 
1. Built-In Redundancy. — There are three reasons to rely on both 
corporate and shareholder taxes. First, the government gets two bites at 
the apple. If one tax is not collected, the other still is. For instance, even 
if corporations avoid the corporate tax by shifting income abroad, share-
holders are still taxed on dividends and capital gains. To make a system 
more reliable, engineers often add a backup.138 This built-in redundancy 
is useful not only for planning strategies already in use, but also for ones 
that have not been developed yet. Just as the Treasury’s integration study 
twenty years ago did not worry about income shifting and inversions,139 it 
is not possible to predict what leaks and distortions will arise two decades 
from now. 
Admittedly, built-in redundancy is effective only when two systems 
have different vulnerabilities. If the two taxes measure income in 
precisely the same way, there is no advantage in using both taxes instead 
of only one. Rather, for one tax to work when the other does not, their 
limitations have to be somewhat uncorrelated. Corporate and share-
holder taxes satisfy this condition. As this Essay has emphasized, these 
taxes define income somewhat differently and thus are avoided with dif-
ferent planning strategies. Admittedly, these disparities are conceptually 
unsatisfying, since it is not clear why two regimes that measure business 
                                                                                                                           
 138. John Downer, When Failure Is an Option: Redundancy, Reliability and 
Regulation in Complex Technical Systems 2–3 (London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci., Ctr. 
for Analysis of Risk & Regulation, Discussion Paper No. 53, 2009), http://www.lse.ac.uk/
accounting/CARR/pdf/dps/disspaper53.pdf [http://perma.cc/XRC3-MSFR]. 
 139. See Graetz Testimony, supra note 70, at 7 (insisting the Treasury’s 
recommendation to tax business profits only at the entity level was no longer sound policy, 
as the internationalization of the economy made taxing at the individual level a more 
plausible option); see also Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Unlocking Business Tax 
Reform, 145 Tax Notes 707, 707 (2014) [hereinafter Graetz & Warren, Unlocking 
Business Tax Reform] (“Whether reducing taxes at the shareholder rather than the 
corporate level was appropriate in the 1990s, it is no longer a sensible component of 
business and investment taxation.”). 
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profits should yield different answers. But ironically, these disparities 
facilitate built-in redundancy, which is a meaningful silver lining. 
2. Repeal Is an Overreaction. — A second reason to use both taxes is 
that, if the goal is to cure distortions from a tax, repeal is too drastic a 
remedy. Instead, cutting the rate is often sufficient. As long as the rate is 
low enough, paying a tax is cheaper than avoiding it. After all, tax plan-
ning is not free. Taxpayers have to hire advisors, incur transaction costs, 
and change business decisions in ways that otherwise are unappealing. 
These costs are justified only if they are less than the tax. 
Obviously, the magnitude of these costs varies for different strat-
egies. For instance, moving factories abroad might be cost effective when 
the U.S. corporate rate is 10% higher than in other jurisdictions, but not 
when it is only 7% higher. Likewise, the threshold for moving patents 
offshore could be a 7% gap, while the threshold for intercompany debt 
could be 5%. If this differential narrows to 3%, shifting income may no 
longer be worth the trouble. 
When tax planning has this sort of cost curve, cutting the rate 
winnows out costlier strategies. As the rate is reduced, fewer strategies 
remain cost effective. If even the cheapest strategies involve significant 
costs, rate cuts can meaningfully ease distortions—indeed, almost as eff-
ectively as repealing the tax—while still collecting some revenue. 
3. Repeal of One Tax Puts More Pressure on the Other. — Third, this 
revenue is another advantage of using both shareholder and corporate 
taxes. If one of these taxes is eliminated—instead of merely cut—the 
surviving tax has to be even higher (assuming the two taxes, in comb-
ination, have to meet a revenue target). For instance, assume the goal is 
to mitigate distortions from both corporate and shareholder lock-in. The 
severity of corporate lock-in depends on the corporate rate (C), while the 
magnitude of shareholder lock-in depends on the shareholder rate (S). 
If tax must be collected either from corporations or shareholders, there 
is a tradeoff: To ease shareholder lock-in (by cutting S), we have to exac-
erbate corporate lock-in (by raising C), and vice versa. Cutting one tax 
more than necessary puts more pressure on the other.140 If a 0% rate is 
used for one, when a 10% rate would be just as effective at eliminating 
the relevant distortion, the other rate has to be correspondingly higher, 
and thus more distortive.141 
                                                                                                                           
 140. See, e.g., Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Joel Slemrod, A Characteristics Approach to 
Optimal Taxation and Tax-Driven Product Innovation 25 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manu-
script), http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/jslemrod/pdf/KS%20Characteristics%20090809.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5AHB-FMPQ] (“[T]ypically, it is not optimal to eliminate distortions 
completely: it is better to have several small distortions than to have large distortions 
somewhere and none elsewhere.”). 
 141. The assumption here is that raising the rate increases the appeal of tax planning 
and thus induces taxpayers to use increasingly costly strategies. Admittedly, though, this 
acceleration should continue only up to a certain point. When the rate is high enough, all 
plausible strategies are already in use. 
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B. Challenges in Keeping Both Taxes 
1. Combined-Rate Decisions: Irrelevance of Rate Allocation. — To be clear, 
although using two taxes can ease distortions from component-rate 
planning (such as corporate and shareholder lock-in), it cannot do so for 
combined-rate planning. For instance, only the combined rate matters 
when taxpayers decide to use a corporation instead of a partnership or, 
for that matter, to save money instead of spending it. For these com-
bined-rate choices, whether tax is collected from corporations or share-
holders usually is irrelevant; it matters only in changing the combined 
rate (e.g., by altering the present value of what is actually collected) or in 
shifting the incidence of the tax, as noted above.142 
2. Imperfect or Unstable Coordination. — Moreover, even for com-
ponent-rate planning, using two taxes is not a panacea. Although relying 
on both taxes has distinct advantages, a key challenge is that it is not easy 
to coordinate corporate and shareholder rates so they always aggregate 
to a particular combined rate. After all, an important rationale for using 
two taxes is that, if one is avoided, the other is still collected. When this 
happens, only a portion of the combined tax is collected, rather than the 
entire amount. This means the combined rate does not apply uniformly 
to all economic activity. Of course, these disparities are likely to be even 
greater if the system relies on only one tax, which sometimes can be 
avoided entirely. But even so, using two taxes is not a complete remedy. It 
still is necessary to shore up both taxes, so they are actually collected. In 
addition, the challenge is not just to coordinate rates now, but also over 
time. This is particularly difficult, since Congress constantly tinkers with 
tax rates.143 
Ideally, rates would be coordinated so one adjusts automatically 
when the other is avoided or changed. Current law does not supply this 
sort of coordination, but there are various ways to do so. For example, a 
reduced shareholder rate for dividends could be available only if the firm 
has paid tax on the distributed profits. Alternatively, dividends could be 
deductible only if the firm withholds shareholder tax on the distribution. 
Likewise, shareholders could reduce their tax bills by claiming a credit 
for tax the corporation already has paid; under this “imputation” system, 
shareholders would backstop any tax the corporation was supposed to 
pay. By cutting its tax bill, a corporation would reduce the shareholder’s 
credit and thus increase the shareholder’s tax liability.144 
                                                                                                                           
 142. See supra section I.A.4.b (discussing the effect of the allocation between cor-
porate and shareholder rates on combined-rate strategies); supra section I.B.6 (discussing 
incidence). 
 143. Cf. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, supra note 88, at 1579–82 (discussing fluct-
uations in the capital gains tax rate over time). 
 144. See Graetz & Warren, Unlocking Business Tax Reform, supra note 139, at 708–09 
(describing shareholder credit integration and arguing that it would be preferable to 
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Instead of an automatic adjustment when a taxpayer avoids one of 
the taxes, a less ambitious approach is an adjustment when Congress 
changes the rate schedule. For instance, Congress could impose a stat-
utory relationship between corporate, shareholder, and personal rates, so 
that a change in one automatically triggers adjustments in the others. 
Obviously, Congress would be free to repeal this formula (or to override 
it explicitly) when changing rates. Yet if it does not do so, the desired 
balance is maintained as rates change.145 
3. Administrative Costs. — Another challenge with using two taxes is 
that administrative costs are higher.146 The government has to administer 
both taxes, and taxpayers have to comply with them. With one regime, 
administrative costs are likely to be lower.147 This is not a trivial advan-
tage, since these regimes are complex. The corporate tax, in particular, is 
extraordinarily intricate. 
Even so, the administrative savings from repeal may not fully 
materialize for two reasons. First, if only one tax is used, it will have to be 
shored up,148 and these enhancements are likely to increase compliance 
and enforcement costs. Second, if taxpayers believe the repealed regime 
may someday be reinstated, their compliance costs will not go down as 
much. For instance, if the corporate tax is repealed, would corporations 
be confident enough in the permanence of this reform to stop tracking 
their tax basis in assets? In any event, even if a second tax adds admin-
istrative costs, this is the price of built-in redundancy and the other 
advantages of two taxes. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INCREMENTAL REFORMS 
As Part II emphasized, the fact that corporate and shareholder taxes 
have different gaps allows them to backstop each other.149 One tax can 
still raise some revenue, even when the other is avoided.150 In addition, 
                                                                                                                           
current law); Graetz & Warren, Integration of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes, supra 
note 45 (manuscript at 8–9) (discussing shareholder credit integration). 
 145. I am grateful to Professor Brennan for this suggestion. 
 146. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard, Corporate Tax Integration: A View from the 
Treasury Department, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 115, 116 (1993) (noting the current system of cor-
porate taxation imposes significant administrative costs). 
 147. For instance, in their 2014 proposal to repeal the corporate tax and replace it 
with a mark-to-market tax on shareholders, Professors Eric Toder and Alan Viard empha-
sized the advantage of eliminating the costs of administering the corporate tax. Toder & 
Viard, Major Surgery Needed, supra note 3, at 26 (“Depreciation schedules, amortization 
rules, inventory accounting, uniform capitalization, and a host of other complexities 
would not need to be considered with respect to corporations.”). 
 148. See supra sections I.B–.C (surveying gaps in corporate and shareholder taxes). 
 149. See supra section II.A.1. 
 150. See supra section II.A.1. 
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using two taxes allows each one to have a lower rate.151 As a result, plan-
ning strategies that avoid only one tax become less appealing.152 
In theory, if all the gaps in one tax are eliminated, the other tax is 
no longer needed as a backstop. But as a practical matter, even the most 
ambitious reforms are unlikely to plug all the gaps in one tax (without 
creating new ones). Part IV argues that even fundamental reforms ben-
efit from using both taxes, instead of only one.153 
The same is true of more modest reforms that preserve the broad 
outlines of current law. This Part focuses on modest reforms, which, as 
this Essay has emphasized, should preserve both taxes.154  
While the focus here is on policy, politics obviously also plays a role. 
So in addition to highlighting important policy choices and offering 
illustrative examples of targeted reforms, this Part also briefly surveys pol-
itical dynamics that are likely to influence business tax reform. 
A. Three Interrelated Choices for Incremental Reform 
After deciding to keep both the corporate and shareholder tax, 
Congress still faces three interrelated choices, which this section con-
siders in turn. First, what should the total tax burden be on corporate 
profits? Second, how should this combined burden be divided between 
corporations and shareholders? This allocation should depend on the 
severity of the component-rate distortions from each tax: The more dis-
tortive tax should have a lower rate. Third, what targeted reforms should 
be used to shore up each tax? Notably, these reforms can influence the 
second decision—that is, the balance between the shareholder and cor-
porate rates. While the less distortive tax should have the higher rate, the 
fact that one is less distortive now does not mean it will always be less 
distortive, since targeted reforms can make a tax less distortive. If one tax 
is shored up more than the other, its share of the overall tax burden 
should increase. 
1. The Combined Rate on Corporate Profits. — In any event, in using one 
tax or two, Congress must decide how much to tax corporate profits. In 
making this choice, Congress should consider a range of familiar issues, 
including empirical estimates of elasticity, incidence, and distributional 
impact, as well as the nation’s revenue needs and social-welfare func-
                                                                                                                           
 151. See supra section II.A.2. 
 152. See supra section II.A.2. 
 153. See infra Part IV. 
 154. Admittedly, this sort of targeted reform is still valuable even if corporate profits 
are subject to only one tax. Yet the use of both taxes affects the need for these reforms in 
competing ways. On the one hand, more reforms are needed, since Congress has to keep 
both taxes in working order. On the other hand, each individual reform becomes less 
important; since each tax has a lower rate, planning strategies to avoid only one tax 
become less distortive. 
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tion.155 Since these issues are beyond this Essay’s scope, this Essay does 
not recommend a rate and offers 40% only as an illustrative example. 
Even so, in focusing on planning, this Essay’s analysis has four 
implications for rates. First, the rates on corporate and noncorporate 
businesses should be comparable, since disparities breed familiar distor-
tions.156 Second, corporate and shareholder taxes are inefficient revenue 
sources. To ease the pressure on these porous regimes, rates should be 
low. The revenue cost of low rates is less than it may seem, since effective 
rates are much lower than stated rates under current law.157 Therefore, 
lower stated rates can generate the same revenue, as long as they are 
actually collected. Third, high rates advance distributional goals only if 
the incidence of these taxes is on high-income investors, instead of on 
low- and middle-income employees.158 Even then, these inefficient taxes 
may not pursue distributional goals as effectively as other policy 
instruments, such as progressive wage taxes. Fourth, Congress should be 
wary of taxing private businesses at a (much) lower rate than the 
personal rate. Otherwise, employee owners will convert salary to business 
profits, treat personal consumption as business expenses, and the like.159 
2. The Balance Between Corporate and Shareholder Rates. — Once 
Congress picks the combined rate for corporate profits, it must allocate 
this burden between corporate and shareholder taxes. For each one, a 
lower rate would induce fewer distortions. But since these taxes have to 
aggregate to the combined-rate target (e.g., of 40%), cutting one means 
increasing the other. If these taxes are equally distortive, the goal should 
be for both taxes to be as low as possible, so the rates should be the same. 
Each should be 22.5%, which is the minimum rate for both taxes that 
                                                                                                                           
 155. These issues are the nuts and bolts of public finance. For an introduction, see 
Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics (2008); Harvey S. Rosen & 
Ted Gayer, Public Finance (10th ed. 2014). 
 156. These distortions are well documented in the literature on corporate integration. 
While a premium can be charged for access to public markets, the prevalence of private-
equity financing suggests that this premium should be modest. See, e.g., Michael Cooper 
et al., Business in the United States: Who Owns It and How Much Tax Do They Pay? 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,651, 2015), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2679689 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that pass-through entities 
earned 54.2% of business income in the United States in 2011, compared with 20.7% in 
1980). 
 157. For example, the Government Accountability Office recently estimated that the 
average effective tax rate on corporations is only 12.6%, which is approximately one-third 
of the stated rate. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-13-520, Corporate Income Tax: 
Effective Tax Rates Can Differ Significantly from the Statutory Rate 14 (2013), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/660/654957.pdf [http://perma.cc/B2GE-D39H] (“For tax year 2010, 
profitable Schedule M-3 filers actually paid U.S. federal income taxes amounting to 12.6 
percent of the worldwide income that they reported in their financial statements (for 
those entities included in their tax returns).”). 
 158. See supra section I.B.6 (explaining how corporate taxes may burden low-income 
workers). 
 159. See supra section I.C.3 (discussing salary-shifting strategies). 
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aggregates to 40%.160 If one is lower than 22.5%, the other has to be 
higher. 
Yet these rates should not necessarily be the same; rather, if one tax 
is more distortive than the other, its rate should be lower in order to 
mitigate its (more severe) distortions. If one is slightly more distortive, it 
should have a modestly lower rate. But if one is significantly more dist-
ortive, it should have a much lower rate. If the corporate tax induces 
more planning—as seems likely, although this empirical question cannot 
be resolved here—its rate should be lower.161 Obviously, this is the oppo-
site of current law (35% for corporations and 23.8% for shareholders).162 
In any event, instead of 22.5% for both rates, a better split would be 20% 
for corporations and 25% for shareholders or, for that matter, 15% for 
corporations and 29.5% for shareholders. 
3. Adjustments for Targeted Reforms. — Raising the shareholder rate 
obviously increases the pressure on this tax. In response, targeted 
reforms should shore up some of its familiar vulnerabilities. With these 
changes, Congress could increase the shareholder rate even more. 
Likewise, Congress could cut the corporate tax a bit less if targeted 
reforms plug some of its leaks. More generally, the appropriate balance 
of rates can shift if targeted reforms address some of the distortions dis-
cussed above. These reforms are needed, moreover, to enable the com-
bined rate that is actually collected to come closer to the combined rate 
on the books. 
B. Political Constraints on Reform 
While decisions about rates and reforms should be based on 
rigorous policy analysis, politics inevitably plays a role as well. So before 
the next two sections offer examples of incremental reforms, this section 
provides a few observations about political dynamics that are likely both 
to constrain and shape business tax reform. 
Fortunately, both sides of the aisle recognize the need to reduce the 
corporate rate and reform the rules for multinationals. Nevertheless, 
support for reform in the abstract does not translate into a consensus for 
specific proposals, which are vigorously debated. 
Reaching a consensus is difficult for four reasons. First, the business 
community is divided. To fund a corporate rate cut, firms want to repeal 
tax breaks for others, instead of tax breaks for themselves. For instance, 
limits on income shifting are more appealing to sectors that cannot shift 
                                                                                                                           
 160. See supra note 35 (reaching this conclusion). 
 161. See Graetz & Warren, Integration of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes, supra 
note 45 (manuscript at 5) (“Given the ability of multinational corporations . . . to shift 
items of income and deduction among countries to obtain tax advantages, and even to 
change the residence of the parent company, it is the corporate, not the shareholder, rate 
that needs to be reduced today.”). 
 162. See supra section I.A.1. 
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income anyway, such as retail and real estate.163 Similarly, cutting the 
corporate rate does not benefit pass-through businesses, so they do not 
want it funded with increases in their taxes, such as repeal of accelerated 
depreciation. Self-interest also colors the perspective of managers. For 
instance, since they benefit from retaining earnings, they may resist 
reforms that encourage distributions. 
Second, statutory rates for corporations and shareholders are 
politically salient. As a result, some Democrats are reluctant to support 
tax cuts for “rich corporations,” even though the tax burdens workers as 
well as investors.164 Meanwhile, Republicans face a parallel political con-
straint. Although they want to cut the corporate rate, they are reluctant 
to pay for it with higher shareholder rates.165 
Third, although rates are politically salient, gaps and planning 
strategies are not. The average voter does not have the esoteric know-
ledge to understand these gaps or to monitor efforts to plug them. 
Therefore, organized interest groups wield disproportionate influence, 
which they use to block or water down these reforms.166 The result is 
stated rates that are much higher than effective rates, a combination that 
has familiar political advantages and policy disadvantages. 
Finally, a political downside of cutting the corporate rate is that this 
tax is invisible to many who bear it.167 Shareholders are more likely to 
focus on taxes they pay than on taxes corporations pay for them. Unso-
phisticated investors ignore the corporate tax because they do not write 
                                                                                                                           
 163. In contrast, income shifting is a mainstay of tax planning for tech companies. 
Richard Rubin, U.S. Companies Are Stashing $2.1 Trillion Overseas to Avoid Taxes, 
Bloomberg (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-
04/u-s-companies-are-stashing-2-1-trillion-overseas-to-avoid-taxes [http://perma.cc/QFN8-
A59Y] (“‘Computing and IT companies especially have a lot of flexibility in where they 
declare their profits.’” (quoting Joseph Kennedy, senior fellow at the Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation)). 
 164. For example, Senator Elizabeth Warren has called the corporate tax a “rigged 
game” and has said that “the problem with our corporate tax code” is “not that taxes are 
far too high for giant corporations, as the lobbyists claim. No, the problem is that the 
revenue generated from corporate taxes is far too low.” Dave Johnson, Must Watch—
Warren’s Warning About the Corporate Tax Giveaway, Campaign for Am.’s Future (Nov. 
19, 2015), http://ourfuture.org/20151119/must-watch-warrens-warning-about-the-coming-
corporate-tax-reform [http://perma.cc/TD7U-E94E]. 
 165. As one commentator put it, “The Republicans running for president all agree on 
one thing, which is significant since they tend to agree on so little: Cut the capital gains tax 
top rate.” Ryan Ellis, Every GOP Presidential Candidate Wants to Cut the Capital Gains 
Tax, Forbes (Jan. 27, 2016, 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanellis/2016/01/
27/capital-gains-tax-rate-cuts-common-to-all-gop-presidential-contenders/#6ff6ad485c7f 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 166. See David M. Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of Austerity, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 453, 474–77 (2012) (noting that “[t]he main problem with cutting the corporate tax 
rate is political” and describing the influence of interest groups on fiscal policy). 
 167. See Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax, supra note 109, at 12–13 (“And 
even insofar as voters understand that a corporate tax necessarily hits some set of people, 
the ambiguity of exactly whom it is taxing may be politically advantageous.”). 
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the check, while sophisticated investors know that some of this burden is 
shifted to workers. Meanwhile, workers are even less aware of the cor-
porate tax’s impact on them. As a result, many beneficiaries of this tax 
cut would not realize they are benefitting and thus would show less grat-
itude to politicians for supporting it. 
Even so, the political payoff would still be substantial if reforms 
improve the anemic U.S. growth rate. Rising wages, lower unemploy-
ment, and booming real estate and stock markets generate good will 
(and greater job security) for elected officials. To reap these policy and 
political benefits, political leaders may seek a “grand bargain,” funding a 
corporate tax cut with base-broadening reforms and higher shareholder 
rates. But admittedly, the political case for this package is weaker than 
the policy case, so its prospects are uncertain. 
C. Incremental Reforms to Ease Distortions from a High Shareholder Rate and 
a Low Corporate Rate 
Since the corporate tax is probably more distortive than the 
shareholder tax, Congress should cut the corporate rate and make up 
the revenue by increasing the shareholder rate, as noted above. But how 
large should this shift be? If the combined rate is 40%, should the cor-
porate and shareholder rates be 20% and 25%? Or 18% and 25%? Or 
15% and 29.5%? Or something else? 
As emphasized above, two constraints complicate this shift from 
corporate to shareholder taxes. First, the shareholder tax also has gaps, 
which are more likely to be exploited as the shareholder rate increases. 
Second, a low corporate rate—and, in particular, one that is lower than 
the personal rate—causes distortions of its own. In response, Congress 
should consider reforms to ease these distortions. This section gives illus-
trative examples of how to do so. Of course, even without this shift from 
corporate to shareholder taxes, these reforms should be considered. Yet 
this shift in rates lends greater urgency to these reforms.  
In offering examples of incremental reforms, this Essay’s goal is not 
to offer a comprehensive analysis of any specific reform, advocate for a 
particular reform package, or argue that these reforms are politically 
plausible. Although the reforms in this section largely preserve current 
law,168 some are more politically plausible than others. Rather, these 
examples are supposed to provide a more concrete sense of how the 
shareholder tax can be shored up and also to emphasize the connection 
between reforms and rates. This sort of reform allows Congress to raise 
the shareholder rate—and cut the corporate rate—even more. 
                                                                                                                           
 168. This analysis uses the same methodology as the Treasury’s December 1992 
integration report, which favored reforms that “retain current law” and “rely on established 
principles and rules.” Treasury, Recommendation for Integration, supra note 67, at 6. 
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1. Tax-Free Appreciation: Charitable Contributions and Stepped-Up Basis. 
— One reform strategy is to block two familiar ways of avoiding the 
shareholder tax: contributing appreciated stock to charity and holding it 
until the shareholder dies. Under current law, these steps permanently 
shelter share appreciation from income tax.169 To plug this gap, one 
option is to tax the holder of the appreciated stock. To do so, a reform 
could treat bequests and charitable contributions as taxable sales. 
Another alternative is to limit the charitable deduction to the taxpayer’s 
basis170 and to require heirs to use the donor’s “carryover” basis.171 If 
Congress has the political will to revoke these tax benefits—and, frankly, 
it is not clear that Congress does—these reforms would make the 
shareholder tax a more reliable source of revenue, so steeper cuts in the 
corporate tax would be feasible. 
2. Salary Shifting and Trapped Earnings in Private Firms. — Two other 
familiar planning strategies complicate any effort to make steep cuts in 
the corporate rate. As noted above, these strategies become appealing 
when corporate rates are lower than personal rates (which apply to 
salaries and noncorporate businesses). First, entrepreneurs take below-
market salaries, transforming high-taxed salary into low-taxed corporate 
income.172 Second, earnings are retained, compounding at a higher 
after-tax rate than if they were distributed.173 
At first blush, these planning strategies seem to create a difficult 
tradeoff for Congress in setting corporate rates: Although low corporate 
rates exacerbate these distortions, they ease other distortions—for 
instance, by reducing the incentive to shift income174 or reincorporate 
abroad.175 
But this tradeoff in using a low corporate rate is not as stark as it first 
seems, since these planning strategies appeal to different types of firms: 
One set of strategies is used by multinationals, while the other is popular 
with family firms. Specifically, income and residence shifting are plausi-
                                                                                                                           
 169. See supra section I.C.1. 
 170. For instance, if a taxpayer buys stock for $1 per share and contributes it to charity 
when it is worth $100, the deduction could be $1 per share instead of $100. As a result, the 
$99 of appreciation is taxed indirectly (in the form of a reduced deduction). While this 
reform reduces the subsidy for contributions of stock, it aligns their treatment with con-
tributions of cash. There is no reason for them to be different. If the government wishes to 
provide a more generous subsidy, there are other ways to do so more uniformly, such as 
increasing the subsidy rate. 
 171. A more modest approach is to disallow the basis step up only for retained 
earnings. See Halperin, Mitigating Inequity, supra note 110, at 654; Warren, ALI 
Integration Report, supra note 24, at 705–06. 
 172. See supra section I.C.3. 
 173. See supra section I.C.2. 
 174. See supra section I.B.1. 
 175. See supra section I.B.2. 
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ble for multinationals, but not for small family businesses.176 In contrast, 
salary shifting makes sense for family businesses, but not for multi-
nationals. After all, for salary shifting to be a viable strategy, the employee 
has to own the business. Otherwise, she is sharing her salary with other 
owners, something the CEO of a multinational obviously would not do. 
Likewise, using a corporation as a tax-advantaged savings vehicle is also 
especially plausible for a family business, since the corporation can fun-
ction like a family investment account. 
Since a low corporate rate deters planning by multinationals, but 
encourages planning by family businesses, a solution is for Congress to 
offer the low rate only to multinationals. There are three ways to do this. 
Since multinationals are almost always public companies, one option is 
for the C-corporation form—and, therefore, the reduced rate—to be 
available only to public firms. Private businesses would have to be pass-
through entities (e.g., LLCs, partnerships, or S-corporations) and thus 
would not have access to the reduced corporate rate. 
Second, if the C-corporation form were still available to private 
firms, the rate structure should be adjusted so a higher marginal rate 
applies to family businesses (to deter salary shifting) than to multi-
nationals (to deter income shifting). To accomplish this, the top personal 
rate (39.6%) should apply to the first $30 million of income—or another 
threshold approximating the earnings of successful family businesses—
and a lower rate (e.g., 15% or 20%) should apply above that level.177 
Third, a special tax could be imposed when employees own more 
than a minimum percentage of a firm.178 The profits of these firms could 
be divided into the return on capital (taxed at the lower corporate rate) 
and disguised labor income (taxed at the higher personal rate). As 
Professor Edward Kleinbard has proposed, these returns could be 
distinguished by applying an assumed rate of return to capital invested in 
                                                                                                                           
 176. The fixed costs of this activity arguably are not justified for businesses with 
modest income. Special tax rules, such as the controlled foreign corporation rules, are 
more likely to apply to family-owned businesses. 
 177. Cf. Dharmapala, The Economics of Corporate and Business Tax Reform, supra 
note 63, at 14 (“In an admittedly rough way, this would subject the income of smaller 
corporations to a higher rate (which can be set to ensure neutrality with regard to 
organizational form) while giving larger corporations the benefit of a lower marginal 
rate.”). Admittedly, this income would be overtaxed if the regular shareholder rate 
applied to dividends and capital gains, but taxpayers could avoid this issue by using pass-
through entities instead. Another approach, proposed by Professor Daniel Halperin, is to 
apply the lower rate to active business income, while applying the higher rate to passive 
income. See Halperin, Mitigating Inequity, supra note 110, at 652 (“The reduced rate also 
should not apply to investment earnings of an active business corporation that retains 
profits beyond the needs of the business.”). 
 178. This threshold could be defined as a share of both vote and value, and it would 
use attribution rules (e.g., for family members, controlled corporations, options, etc.). 
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the firm (e.g., measured by tax basis).179 An extra tax could apply to 
profits above this level.180 The bottom line, then, is that a corporate-rate 
cut implemented in one of these three ways can mitigate distortions from 
a high corporate rate (e.g., income shifting) without exacerbating 
distortions from a low corporate rate (e.g., salary shifting). 
3. Trapped Earnings in Public Firms. — Yet cutting the corporate rate 
can create distortions not only in private firms, but also in public ones. 
Specifically, a low rate can discourage public firms from distributing 
earnings, as noted above.181 This is undesirable because the managers of 
public firms already have familiar agency-cost reasons to hoard cash. By 
not distributing this cash, managers maintain control over it and can use 
it in self-interested ways (e.g., for perquisites or pet projects).182 
Yet targeted reforms can counter this tax incentive to retain earnings 
so that the corporate rate can be cut without “trapping” earnings in this 
way. For example, the accumulated earnings tax under current law is 
supposed to stop retained earnings “beyond the reasonable needs of the 
business.”183 But this test sets a low bar, since the IRS and courts lack the 
expertise to apply it effectively; reinvesting in the business is sufficient, 
even if this is not the best use of capital.184 Firms can also keep a sig-
nificant amount of cash on hand.185 
Another approach, known as a “split rate” system, taxes retained 
earnings at a higher rate than distributed earnings.186 Compared with the 
accumulated earnings tax, this alternative is easier to administer: Instead 
of imposing an extra tax only on excess retained earnings—a category 
that is hard to define—split-rate systems impose an extra cost on all 
retained earnings.187 This differential is desirable, since dividends 
                                                                                                                           
 179. See Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents 5 
Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 41, 57–58 (2010) (describing model in which business income is split 
into “labor and capital components” in order to calculate the taxable income). Capital 
invested could be measured with either the firm’s basis in assets or the investors’ basis in 
their investments in the firm. A choice is needed about whether to focus on the firm’s net 
or gross assets at the firm level, and how to treat debt at the investor level. Id. 
 180. This sort of rule has been used in Nordic countries, which have imposed this tax 
at the entity level. See id.  
 181. See supra section I.C.2 (discussing practice of retaining dividends). 
 182. See Schizer, Tax and Governance, supra note 75, at 10. 
 183. I.R.C. § 533 (2012). 
 184. See, e.g., Homer L. Elliott, The Accumulated Earnings Tax and the Reasonable 
Needs of the Business: A Proposal, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 34, 40 (1970) (“In practice, widely 
held public corporations have been exempted from the accumulated earnings tax.”). 
 185. See Bardahl Mfg. Corp. v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1030, 1034, 1044 (1965), 
1965 WL 1121 (permitting the firm to keep enough cash for one full operating cycle that 
accounts for turnover in inventory, accounts receivable, and accounts payable). 
 186. See Warren, ALI Integration Report, supra note 24, at 641–42. 
 187. For instance, if the corporate rate is 30% and firms can deduct one-half of each 
dividend, the effective rate for dividends (15%) is half the rate for retained earnings 
(30%). 
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enhance corporate governance (by allowing investors to control this 
cash), but are undersupplied for agency-cost reasons (since managers 
usually prefer to control cash).188 As a result, the tax cut is conditioned 
on a step we want managers to take, instead of ones we do not want to 
encourage, such as shifting real activity abroad for tax reasons.189 
4. Tax-Exempt Shareholders. — Under current law, the shareholder tax 
does not reach tax-exempt shareholders, but the corporate tax does so 
indirectly. In relying more heavily on shareholder taxes, then, Congress 
has two choices: It can give up on this revenue, or it can begin taxing tax 
exempts on dividends and capital gains.190 Arguably, tax exempts should 
also pay tax on interest, so their debt and equity investments are taxed 
the same way.191 
In setting the rate for this new shareholder tax on tax exempts, one 
possibility is to offset the corporate rate cut.192 For instance, if the 
corporate rate falls from 35% to 20%, this 15% of corporate tax can be 
replaced with an 18.75% shareholder tax.193 Politically, the easiest way to 
justify this new tax on tax exempts is to argue that it replaces the tax they 
were already paying indirectly.194 
Yet in principle, the rate should not turn on what tax exempts 
already pay, but on a policy judgment about the right level. This 
assessment should account for social benefits of tax exempts, which vary 
for different types of exempt organizations. A further question is whether 
                                                                                                                           
 188. See Schizer, Tax and Governance, supra note 75, at 10. 
 189. More fundamental reforms can also counter the incentive to retain earnings. For 
instance, if shareholders are required to mark their stock to market, retained earnings are 
taxed currently, to the extent they increase the stock’s value. Imposing an interest charge 
on dividends, as a way to compensate for deferral, would have a similar effect. 
 190. Tax exempts should also be taxed on equity derivatives, which are close sub-
stitutes for corporate stock. 
 191. As noted above, corporate revenue that funds interest payments to a tax exempt 
are never taxed under current law, since the corporation can deduct these payments. See 
supra section I.C.4. A further question is whether this tax should apply only to corporate 
debt or to other types of debt as well (to avoid creating a tax preference for the debt of 
pass-through businesses, governments, etc.). See Graetz & Warren, Integration of 
Corporate and Shareholder Taxes, supra note 45 (manuscript at 104–05). 
 192. See Treasury, Integration Study, supra note 5, at 79 (“This Report recommends, 
in general, retaining the current level of taxation of corporate equity income allocable to 
tax-exempt shareholders.”). 
 193. Assume a nonprofit owns a share of stock that earns $100 per share. With a 35% 
rate, there would be $65 left over to distribute (tax-free) to the nonprofit. If the corporate 
tax is cut to 20%, so that $80 is distributed, an 18.75% tax on the nonprofit shareholder 
would bring the after-tax amount back to $65, since 0.1875 * 80 = 15. The assumption here 
is that a 15% reduction in the tax would lead to a 15% cut in corporate tax collections. But 
if the rate cut leads to less avoidance, a more modest tax on nonprofits would cover the 
difference. The rate could also be lower if it applied to interest income as well, since the 
base for this tax would be broader. 
 194. Notably, tax exempts are already taxed on equity investments in pass-through 
businesses, since these returns are usually taxed as unrelated business taxable income. 
I.R.C. § 513 (2012). 
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exempting investment returns is the most effective way to encourage the 
good work that nonprofits do (e.g., in providing health care, education, 
social services, etc.). As noted above, the tax exemption is arguably less 
effective at supporting this good work than the charitable deduction, 
which rewards nonprofits that attract donations instead of ones that 
invest a surplus successfully.195 
5. Foreigner Shareholders. — Like tax exempts, foreign investors are 
taxed indirectly by the corporate tax, but they (mostly) avoid the 
shareholder tax under current law.196 Any effort to rely more heavily on 
shareholder taxes must either forgo this revenue or change the treat-
ment of foreign shareholders. 
Changing the rules for foreigners is harder than for tax exempts for 
two reasons. First, a vast network of tax treaties would have to be 
renegotiated.197 In principle, the United States could override these 
treaties with legislation, as long as the intent to do so is clear.198 But the 
United States rarely overrides treaties199 and has done so mainly to target 
abuses.200 Second, to collect this tax, the United States would need infor-
mation about the holdings of foreigner shareholders, as well as 
infrastructure to withhold the tax. Although this infrastructure is already 
in place for dividends, one would have to be created for capital gains, 
which is not straightforward. 
Assuming a tax on foreign shareholders can be collected, would it 
enhance national welfare? This revenue would add to the U.S. GDP, 
while allowing a lower rate to govern U.S. taxpayers. But there are two 
reasons to tread carefully, as noted above. First, the United States benefits 
from attracting foreign investors, although a low tax is unlikely to deter 
them given the unique appeal of the U.S. market. Second, if foreign 
governments respond by raising their taxes on U.S. investors, U.S. 
revenue would fall as U.S. taxpayers claim foreign tax credits. Therefore, 
taxing foreign shareholders enhances U.S. welfare only if the United 
                                                                                                                           
 195. See supra section I.C.4. 
 196. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 197. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention, arts. 
11, 13 (2016), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/H77Y-3F43]. 
 198. E.g., Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); Richard L. Doernberg, 
Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and Congressional 
Arrogation of Authority, 42 Tax Law. 173, 198 (1989). 
 199. For instance, when the United States in 1986 enacted section 163(j), the branch 
profits tax, which was arguably inconsistent with existing treaties, it deferred imple-
menting the tax until treaties were renegotiated. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty 
Overrides: A Qualified Defence of U.S. Practice, in Tax Treaties and Domestic Law 65, 75–
76 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2006). 
 200. Examples include the branch profits tax, the earnings stripping rule, the multiparty 
financing regulations, and the reverse hybrid rule. See id. at 75–78. In a sense, shifting the 
tax to shareholders is a reaction to abuse—in particular, the gaming of source and other 
rules by multinationals—but the solution is at some remove from the abuse. 
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States can still attract enough foreign investment and raise revenue on a 
net basis. 
D. Incremental Reforms to Ease Distortions from a High Corporate Rate 
Since the corporate tax is probably more distortive than the 
shareholder tax under current law, Congress has good reason to cut the 
corporate rate and make up the revenue by increasing the shareholder 
rate, as noted above. But these rate adjustments exacerbate other distor-
tions, and the prior section canvassed various ways to mitigate them. 
Of course, instead of cutting the corporate tax, a different strategy is 
to shore up this tax. If the corporate tax is strengthened, there is less need 
to cut this tax (or, at least, to cut it as much). If this strategy is successful, 
there also is less pressure to increase the shareholder tax (or, at least, to 
increase it as much). This section offers illustrative examples of how to 
diminish the need for these rate adjustments by strengthening the corp-
orate tax. 
Since there is an extensive literature on reforming the corporate 
tax,201 only a few examples are offered here, which preserve the broad 
contours of current law. Again, the goal is not to advocate for particular 
reforms. Instead, these examples illustrate how to strengthen the cor-
porate tax with incremental reforms, while showing how difficult this task 
is. In addition, this discussion emphasizes the connection between 
reforms and rates: Targeted reforms to strengthen the corporate tax can 
enable the cut in the corporate rate—and the offsetting increase in the 
shareholder rate—to be more modest. 
1. Interest. — While this Essay recommends using two taxes, debt—
unlike equity—is taxed only once under current law. Because firms can 
deduct interest, lenders pay the only tax on debt-financed revenue.202 
Using only one tax creates three problems. First, there is no built-in 
redundancy, so no tax is collected when lenders are foreign or tax 
exempt. Second, if the goal is to discourage tax planning, cutting this tax 
could be as effective as eliminating it. In a sense, the interest deduction is 
a form of repeal. Instead of cutting the corporate tax on debt-financed 
income, it eliminates this tax entirely. In doing so, the interest deduction 
is not an effective way to combat corporate tax planning; on the contrary, 
this deduction is actually an essential ingredient of many planning strat-
                                                                                                                           
 201. For a recent distillation of key issues, see Dharmapala, The Economics of 
Corporate and Business Tax Reform, supra note 63. 
 202. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. For example, assume a corporation 
borrows $100 million to buy a factory. If the factory generates $5 million of revenue, and 
the corporation has to pay $5 million of interest expense, the corporation has no taxable 
income from the factory. The $5 million interest deduction shields the factory’s $5 million 
of revenue from tax. Instead, only the lenders pay tax (on the $5 million of interest 
payments they receive from the firm). 
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egies for avoiding corporate tax.203 Third, since no revenue is collected at 
the corporate level, the investor tax on interest has to be correspondingly 
higher and thus more distortive. 
In response, some of this tax burden should be shifted to 
corporations. One way of doing so is to offer only a partial deduction for 
interest. Like travel and entertainment expenses, a portion of interest 
would be deductible (e.g., 50%). At the same time, Congress could offer 
an offsetting reduction in the lender’s tax on interest income. For 
instance, the same fraction of this income could be excluded (e.g., 50%). 
If the same deduction and exclusion were also applied to dividends, the 
tax preference for debt would be eliminated, along with the familiar 
distortions it causes. 
Another alternative is to eliminate the interest deduction entirely, 
while cutting the corporate tax substantially. Broadening the base in this 
way can help fund the rate cut. At the same time, the treatment of 
interest and dividends could be conformed at the investor level. For 
example, if the target combined rate is 40%, the corporate rate could be 
15% or 20% (with no interest deduction), while the rate for dividends 
and interest could be 29.5% or 25%.204 
2. Income Shifting. — In addition to the debt–equity distinction, 
another reform priority is to block income shifting. But this problem is 
excruciatingly difficult to overcome, as long as the United States 
continues to have a much higher corporate rate than other countries. In 
fact, the two leading options for international reform would exacerbate 
this problem, instead of solving it, by offering favorable treatment to 
foreign earnings: First, a territorial system would tax U.S. multinationals 
only on U.S. earnings, exempting foreign earnings; second, a minimum 
                                                                                                                           
 203. For instance, intercompany debt often is used to shift income out of the United 
States. See Michael J. Graetz, A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax Treatment of 
Interest Expenses, 62 Bull. for Int’l Tax’n 486, 486 (2008) [hereinafter Graetz, A 
Multilateral Solution] (noting the “increased government concerns with the role of debt 
in sophisticated tax avoidance techniques”). 
 204. Admittedly, a full interest deduction is needed for financial firms. Their business 
model is to make loans with borrowed money, earning a profit on the spread. To tax only 
this spread, an interest deduction is needed. For example, if a firm borrows $100 million 
at 2%, and lends it at 3%, it will have $3 million of revenue and $1 million of profit. If the 
$3 million of revenue is taxed at 20%, the $600,000 tax is equivalent to a 60% tax on the $1 
million profit. To address this issue, banks could have their own tax regime, like securities 
dealers and insurance companies under current law. If such a regime is developed, there 
are good reasons to conform the treatment of debt and equity. Eliminating the tax 
preference for debt—for instance, by offering a cost of capital allowance for equity—
reduces the need for burdensome (and potentially ineffective) financial regulation. See 
Mark Roe & Michael Tröge, Degradation of the Financial System Due to the Structure of 
Corporate Taxation 7–9 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Papers Series in Law 
Working Paper, No. 317/2016, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2767151 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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tax would tax U.S. multinationals on both their U.S. and foreign 
earnings, but would apply a reduced rate to foreign earnings.205 
In theory, income shifting can be blocked with better source rules, 
which treat income as really earned in the United States, even if 
taxpayers say otherwise. A virtue of reforming source rules is that they 
govern both U.S. and foreign firms, so tougher rules do not put U.S. 
firms at a comparative disadvantage.206 But source rules are hard to 
improve for a familiar reason: Conceptually, the source of income is 
often unclear.207 For instance, profit from a cellphone could be 
characterized as originating not only from where its technology was 
invented, but also from where it was manufactured or sold. Since source 
rules resolve this sort of issue in arbitrary ways, they are easy to 
manipulate.208 Likewise, when value is added in different jurisdictions, 
the allocation of profit among them is malleable. Multinationals include 
low-tax affiliates in the production process and allocate disproportionate 
profits to them.209 This internal accounting has little significance—aside 
from cutting the U.S. tax bill—since the same shareholders own all these 
affiliates. 
In response, a familiar alternative is to ignore this internal 
accounting. Instead, income can be allocated with a formula based on 
                                                                                                                           
 205. Harry Grubert, a leading economist at the Treasury Department, and Professor 
Rosanne Altshuler have proposed a minimum tax on all foreign income or just on above-
market returns earned abroad. See Grubert & Altshuler, Fixing the System, supra note 65, 
at 676–78 (providing an analysis of alternative proposals). The Obama Administration has 
also proposed a minimum tax. See Dep’t of Treasury, General Explanations of the 
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 Revenue Proposals 20 (2015), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf [http://.perma.
cc/3RZL-CGKX]. 
 206. See Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax, supra note 109, at 106 (“[F]or 
business activity in the U.S., foreign companies are taxed on their U.S. activity in much the 
same way that U.S. companies would be taxed on such activities . . . .”). 
 207. See id. at 107 (“‘[S]ource’ is an idea that verges on having ‘no there 
there’ . . . .”); Michael P. Devereux, Issues in the Design of Taxes on Corporate Profit, 65 
Nat’l Tax J. 709, 725 (2012) (“There is simply no answer to the question: in which country 
is profit generated? All . . . elements of the company’s activities play a part in generating 
worldwide profit.”). 
 208. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 Tax L. Rev. 99, 
143 (2011) (arguing that source rules are “largely artificial” and “devoid of any conceptual 
foundation”). But see Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International 
Taxation, 32 Yale J. on Reg. 311, 314 (2015) (defending source rules as potentially 
coherent). 
 209. Current law accounts for each corporation separately, even if they are commonly 
owned. Although affiliates are supposed to pay the same “arm’s length” price as an 
unrelated party, this standard is famously malleable, especially if there are no comparable 
transactions with third parties. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael 
C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary 
Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497, 501 (2009). 
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the location of the firm’s employees, property, and sales.210 Yet this sort of 
formula also can be manipulated in familiar ways, for instance, by moving 
employees and capital to low-tax jurisdictions.211 At first blush, sales may 
seem harder to manipulate, since firms want to sell their products in the 
United States.212 But firms can still access the U.S. market without 
(technically) having any U.S. sales: They can sell to an independent 
distributor in a low-tax jurisdiction, which then sells in the United States. 
Even if these avoidance strategies are blocked, the formula still has to be 
coordinated with other jurisdictions to prevent double taxation. This is a 
tall order, since the OECD opposes formulary apportionment.213 
Instead of general changes in source rules, narrower reforms can 
target especially mobile deductions and income, such as interest deduc-
tions and intellectual property income. For instance, firms should not be 
allowed to source interest deductions in the United States—where they 
offset high-tax income—if the loan generates income in low-tax juris-
dictions. A formula can block this strategy, at least to an extent, by 
allocating interest based on each affiliate’s earnings, assets, and equity.214 
Likewise, a tech firm’s profits derive largely from intellectual property. 
Instead of allowing firms to choose where to source these profits, a 
                                                                                                                           
 210. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It Better 
than the Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 Nat’l Tax J. 1145, 1145 
(2010) (“Under formula apportionment . . . income allocated to a jurisdiction depends on 
the share of worldwide measurable factors such as capital, payrolls and sales that are 
located there.”). 
 211. See id. at 1151; James R. Hines, Jr., Income Misattribution Under Formula 
Apportionment 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15185, 2009), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15185.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CVT-7EPQ] (discussing how 
this formula “creates incentives to modify . . . operations in order to reduce associated tax 
burdens”). 
 212. See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 209, at 508–10 (“The key advantage of a sales-
based formula is that sales are far less responsive to tax differences across markets . . . .”). 
 213. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting 14 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
3VZB-PEH4] (“[T]here is consensus among governments that . . . a system of formulary 
apportionment of profits is not a viable way forward; it is also unclear that the behavioural 
changes companies might adopt in response . . . would lead to investment decisions that 
are more efficient . . . than under a separate entity approach.”). 
 214. After all, if multinationals borrow in the United States to invest in low-tax 
jurisdictions, this matching of high-tax deductions with low-tax income subsidizes overseas 
investment. See Graetz, A Multilateral Solution, supra note 203, at 492–93 (proposing a 
worldwide formula based on assets or income); Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 
Interest Deductions in a Multijurisdictional World 3–4 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 725, 2015), http://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2414&context=law_and_economics [http://
perma.cc/X9M8-7CYU] (analyzing ways in which worldwide debt cap or net financing 
deduction (NFD) regimes ease ownership distortions and also address concerns about 
base erosion). In this spirit, the OECD recently released a discussion draft to explore 
various options. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions 
and Other Financial Payments 2 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/discussion-
draft-action-4-interest-deductions.pdf [http://perma.cc/VGU4-HCRL]. 
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formula (or other rule) can allocate them based on the location of 
research or sales.215 While this sort of narrow reform can offer some 
relief, income shifting will continue to be a serious problem as long as 
the corporate rate in the United States remains uniquely high. Thus, 
income shifting is a compelling reason to cut the corporate rate, since 
other reforms are unlikely to solve this problem on their own.216 
3. Residence Shifting. — In contrast, cutting the corporate rate is not 
the only effective way to eliminate the appeal of inversions. A territorial 
system accomplishes this goal by exempting a U.S. firm’s foreign earnings 
from U.S. tax. Like foreign firms, they pay only foreign tax on foreign 
operations and can repatriate earnings tax-free. At first blush, a 
territorial system seems to collect substantially less revenue, but this 
actually may not be the case, since the effective rate on foreign earnings 
is already low.217 Even so, an important downside of a territorial system, 
noted above, is that the incentive to shift income persists and could even 
grow stronger. 
However, if the United States continues to tax worldwide income, 
inversions will remain a challenge, unless Congress cuts the corporate 
rate substantially. For example, section 7874 blocks some inversions, 
while allowing others.218 Although the Treasury has introduced a series of 
regulations to tighten up the rules, a truly comprehensive ban on 
inversions would be overbroad. For instance, if the rule were “once a U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 215. Graetz & Doud, supra note 59, at 426 (proposing to source intellectual property 
(IP) income based on the location of research or sales). In contrast, current law leaves 
multinationals considerable discretion to source IP income where they want. For instance, 
although the sale of IP for a fixed price is sourced in the seller’s resident country, the sale 
for a contingent price is generally sourced where the IP is used. 
 216. Professors Toder and Viard estimate that a reduction in income shifting offsets a 
meaningful portion of the revenue loss from cutting the corporate rate: If the rate is cut to 
15%, corporate tax revenue declines by $212 billion without any change in income 
shifting, but by only $162 billion once this change is taken into account. Toder & Viard, A 
Proposal, supra note 3, at 48. 
 217. The Treasury estimates a loss of $130 billion over ten years from switching to a 
territorial system, while earlier estimates by the Treasury, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, and the Congressional Budget Office have estimated a loss of between $40 
billion and $76 billion in that window. President’s Econ. Recovery Advisory Bd., Report on 
Tax Reform Options: Simplification, Compliance, and Corporate Taxation 90 (2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UHM-ZJMP]. Other commentators estimate that the shift 
will involve no substantial revenue losses, on the theory that firms are already using 
deferral and foreign tax credits to shelter earnings. See, e.g., Eric Drabkin, Kenneth 
Serwin & Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Implications of a Switch to a Territorial Tax System in 
the United States: A Critical Comparison to the Current System 5 (2013) (unpublished 
working paper), http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/391_BRG_Implications%
20of%20Territorial%20Tax_Nov2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/5NY8-W2J3]. 
 218. See I.R.C. § 7874 (2012) (taxing an inverted firm as a U.S. firm if it does not have 
sufficient business assets in its new jurisdiction of incorporation and if a sufficiently large 
percentage of the inverted corporation is owned by shareholders of the predecessor 
domestic corporation). For a discussion of inversions, see supra section I.B.2. 
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firm, always a U.S. firm,” it could deter mergers with foreign firms that 
are not tax motivated, while also not stopping new businesses from org-
anizing as foreign corporations.219 Given these difficulties, current law 
does not seek to stop all inversions, but to make them incrementally 
more costly so that the trickle does not become a flood.220 This task is 
more daunting when the corporate rate is 35%, instead of 15% or 20%. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 
So far, this Essay has focused on incremental reform, but its core 
argument also applies to more ambitious reforms: Even when funda-
mental reforms seem economically comparable, they can induce 
different planning strategies, which usually are easier to block with two 
taxes than with one. This Part assesses the vulnerability of five 
fundamental reforms to the various planning strategies discussed above: 
first, the comprehensive business income tax; second, the “dual BEIT”; 
third, mark-to-market accounting or interest charges for shareholders; 
fourth, imputation; and fifth, corporate cash-flow taxation. While a 
comprehensive analysis of these proposals would fill several volumes, the 
modest goal here is to show the relevance of this Essay’s analysis to 
fundamental reforms. 
A. Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
One option, which the Treasury called the “comprehensive business 
income tax” in its 1992 integration report, is to replace current corporate 
and shareholder taxes with a single entity-level tax.221 This proposal 
repeals the shareholder tax on distributions and possibly also on capital 
gains.222 Similarly, businesses no longer deduct interest, and creditors do 
not include it. 
This proposal offers four advantages. First, aligning the treatment of 
debt and equity eases an important distortion under current law.223 
Second, since debt features prominently in many tax-planning strategies, 
                                                                                                                           
 219. Another strategy is to use the location of the headquarters instead of the site of 
incorporation to define residence, on the theory that managers might be reluctant to 
move. Yet if they do move, this avoidance strategy becomes even more distortive, especially 
if there are positive externalities in having the headquarters (and highly skilled workers) 
in the United States. 
 220. Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of 
U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 Tax L. Rev. 377, 413 (2011) (“Rising electivity of the 
worldwide residence-based U.S. corporate tax is both plausible and, to a modest degree, 
demonstrable . . . . Yet complete electivity appears to remain far off.”). 
 221. See Treasury, Integration Study, supra note 5, at 119. 
 222. The Treasury discusses different ways to treat capital gains, without specifying a 
particular approach. For instance, to avoid taxing capital gains from retained earnings, the 
Treasury considers using a dividend reinvestment plan or relying on a purchaser’s built-in 
capital loss to offset a seller’s capital gain. Id. at 211. 
 223. See supra section I.B.3. 
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CBIT defangs these strategies. Third, a high entity-level tax eliminates 
the incentive to retain earnings or recharacterize salary as corporate 
income. Fourth, if capital gains are not taxed, shareholder lock-in ceases 
to be an issue. 
Although these advantages are significant, they come at a steep cost. 
A high entity-level tax breeds familiar distortions, including income and 
residence shifting and corporate lock-in.224 CBIT forgoes the advantages 
of built-in redundancy by collecting tax only once. Moreover, eliminating 
the shareholder tax, instead of merely cutting it, goes further than 
necessary to ease shareholder-level distortions. 
B. Dual BEIT 
An important problem under current law, emphasized above, is that 
debt and equity are taxed differently. A firm can deduct its cost of capital 
in issuing debt (since interest is deductible), but not in issuing equity 
(since dividends are not deductible). In principle, the treatment of debt 
and equity can be conformed in two different ways: On the one hand, a 
deduction for the cost of capital can be disallowed for both; on the other 
hand, this deduction can be allowed for both. The reform discussed in the 
last section, CBIT, uses the first strategy by repealing the deduction for 
interest expense. In contrast, another option is to authorize a deduction 
for equity. Put another way, the current (nondeductible) treatment of 
equity can be extended to debt (as CBIT does), or the current 
(deductible) treatment of debt can be extended to equity. 
This second approach, which offers corporations a deduction for the 
cost of equity capital, is a prominent feature of the “dual BEIT.” This 
proposal’s author, Professor Kleinbard, seeks to tax corporate stock with 
rules based on current law’s treatment of debt. Every year, a firm would 
deduct (and investors would include) an amount based on its cost of 
capital, regardless of whether the firm issues debt or equity.225 The 
amount that the firm deducts (and investors include) is based on what 
the firm’s cost of capital is assumed to be, and does not necessarily equal 
the amount the firm pays out in a given year. 
Yet like current law’s treatment of interest, this approach has an 
important disadvantage: Since this assumed yield is taxed only at the 
shareholder level, not at the corporate level, there is no built-in redun-
                                                                                                                           
 224. See supra section I.B (describing planning strategies if the shareholder rate is 
zero and all tax is collected from the corporation). 
 225. For example, if a firm issues $5 billion of stock and $5 billion of debt, pays no 
current interest or dividends, and has a cost of capital of 6%, it deducts (and investors 
include) $600 million each year. In effect, dual BEIT extends the original issue discount 
rules of section 1271 through section 1275 to corporate stock. See Edward D. Kleinbard, 
We Are Better than This: How Government Should Spend Our Money 400 (2015) 
(replacing firm-level interest deductions with cost-of-capital allowance, which is allowed for 
equity as well as for debt). 
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dancy. As a result, when investors are foreign or tax exempt, no tax is 
collected. 
In addition to the investor-level tax, the dual BEIT also has an entity-
level tax, but its use of two taxes is not consistent with the approach 
recommended in this Essay. The difference is that Professor Kleinbard 
divides a business’s return into two components—normal returns and 
above-normal returns—and uses a separate tax for each: Investors pay the 
only tax on normal returns, while the entity pays the only tax on above-
normal returns. Therefore, the dual BEIT taxes each component of the 
return once, and only once. In contrast, this Essay recommends col-
lecting some tax at both levels for both types of returns: Normal returns 
should be taxed at both the entity and investor level, as would above-
normal returns. In a sense, Professor Kleinbard is slicing a business’s 
returns vertically (so each type of return is taxed by different taxes), 
while this Essay recommends slicing returns horizontally (so each type of 
return is taxed by both taxes). Therefore, even though the dual BEIT 
deploys two taxes, the division of labor between them is quite different. 
Instead of relying on built-in redundancy and low rates to constrain 
planning, Professor Kleinbard uses more sophisticated rules to address 
various distortions. For example, he shows that taxing shareholders based 
on an assumed yield can mitigate lock-in and reduce an employee-
owner’s incentive to recharacterize salary as investment return. While 
these reforms are promising, they could still be used in a system that 
taxes the entire return at both levels and thus offers built-in 
redundancy.226 
C. Mark-to-Market Accounting or Interest Charges 
Another option is to use mark-to-market accounting to strengthen 
the shareholder tax, as Professors Toder and Viard, as well as others, have 
proposed.227 Taxing gains annually—even when shareholders do not 
sell—offers two important advantages. First, it mitigates shareholder lock-
                                                                                                                           
 226. For example, investors could be taxed initially on the assumed yield, but a 
subsequent adjustment could be added at realization, as in the contingent debt regime 
under current law. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (2012). To ensure that an entity-level tax is 
also collected, a firm could be allowed to deduct only a portion of its cost of capital. For 
instance, the firm could deduct half of its assumed yield, as well as half of any additional 
amounts it pays in the subsequent adjustment. Shareholders would include both of these 
amounts, and the corporate and shareholder rates would be coordinated to yield the 
appropriate combined tax rate. 
 227. See generally Toder & Viard, Major Surgery Needed, supra note 3, at 29–31 
(proposing to replace the corporate tax with a mark-to-market tax on shareholders); 
Toder & Viard, A Proposal, supra note 3, at 1–2 (presenting a modified version of the 
2014 proposal which preserves the corporate tax but with a significantly reduced rate); see 
also Bankman, supra note 3, at 1347–48 (proposing a mark-to-market or “market-value 
added” on corporations); Dodge, supra note 3, at 293 (outlining a “two-tier integration 
proposal” that would abolish the corporate income tax and impose a mark-to-market tax); 
Knoll, supra note 3, at 24–25 (proposing a mark-to-market tax on corporations). 
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in. Delaying a sale no longer defers capital gains tax. Likewise, bequests 
and contributions of appreciated stock no longer avoid this tax entirely 
(since taxpayers have to pay tax on appreciation every year). 
A second advantage, which is less familiar, is that a mark-to-market 
tax on shareholders counters a firm’s tax incentive to retain earnings. 
Without this reform, if the corporate rate is lower than the personal rate, 
firms are more tax efficient investors than shareholders, since profits 
inside the firm are taxed at the (lower) corporate tax, while profits 
outside the firm are taxed at the (higher) personal tax. Eventually, profits 
inside the firm also are taxed at the shareholder rate, but this tax is 
deferred under current law.228 In contrast, this deferral is eliminated 
under mark-to-market accounting, so investments inside the firm are 
taxed at both the corporate and shareholder rate.229 As a result, these 
investments lose their tax advantage over investments outside the 
corporation.230 
Yet notwithstanding these benefits, a mark-to-market tax poses fam-
iliar valuation and liquidity challenges, which are manageable only for 
publicly traded assets.231 Since this reform cannot be used for private 
businesses, collectibles, or real estate, it creates a tax preference for these 
investments. Investors may shy away from publicly traded assets, and 
owners of private firms may hesitate to go public.232 
To avoid this sort of distortion, the same timing rule has to apply to 
all investments. Since a mark-to-market rule cannot do so, a different 
                                                                                                                           
 228. See supra sections I.C.1–.2. 
 229. Toder & Viard, A Proposal, supra note 3, at 14. 
 230. For example, assume the corporate rate is 0%, shareholder and personal rates are 
40%, and a 10% pretax return is available both inside and outside the firm. Under 
realization accounting, a $1 million investment grows faster if earnings are retained for 
three years than if they are distributed and invested in a bond: The profit is $198,600, 
instead of $191,016. Specifically, if earnings are retained in the firm (so they can 
compound tax-free), the investment’s value grows to $1,331,000 after three years. 
Distribution of the $331,000 profit yields $198,600 after the 40% shareholder tax. In 
contrast, if the $100,000 of earnings are distributed each year (and thus are subject to a 
40% shareholder tax), the shareholder has only $60,000 each year to invest in a bond, and 
the 10% return on the bond also is taxable. As a result, the $60,000 paid in the first year 
compounds to $67,416 (i.e., 60,000 x 1.06 x 1.06), and the $60,000 paid in the second year 
compounds to $63,600 (i.e., 60,000 x 1.06). When added to the $60,000 paid in the third 
year, these amounts total only $191,016. 
But if the stock is marked to market, the after-tax profit shrinks to $191,016—the 
same as with the immediate distribution—as long as retained earnings cause a dollar-for-
dollar increase in the stock price and shareholders sell a portion of their stock each year to 
fund the mark-to-market tax. In effect, the $1,000,000 investment grows by only 6% each 
year, to $1,191,016 after three years. 
 231. If annual payments are too onerous, even the tax on publicly traded shares can 
apply to only a portion of gains each year. See, e.g., Toder & Viard, A Proposal, supra note 
3, at 34 (proposing a smoothing mechanism that taxes 20% of gains each year). 
 232. In response, Professors Toder and Viard propose to tax pre-IPO gains at a 
reduced rate and to allow this tax to be paid over ten years. Id. at 23–25. 
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remedy is needed for shareholder lock-in and trapped earnings. As an 
alternative, economist Harry Grubert and Professor Rosanne Altshuler 
propose to delay the shareholder tax until stock is sold, as under current 
law, but to add an interest charge to compensate the government for this 
delay.233 Yet their proposal is less accurate than a mark-to-market rule. 
Instead of measuring the return each year, it uses (imperfect) 
assumptions to allocate gains across the relevant years, creating planning 
opportunities when these assumptions are inaccurate.234 This is all the 
more true when a taxpayer’s bracket changes during these years.235 
In addition to creating new distortions, mark-to-market accounting 
and interest charges share two other limitations. First, unlike corporate 
taxes, they do not reach tax exempts and (mostly) miss foreign 
shareholders as well. Second, both proposals are likely to encounter 
political opposition. Rules that impose interest charges under current 
law are unpopular, as is taxing gains that could prove temporary.236 While 
these proposals may be easier to sell if they applied only to high-net-
worth shareholders, as David Miller has proposed,237 this limit would 
introduce another boundary for taxpayers to game. 
Therefore, in shoring up the shareholder tax with a mark-to-market 
rule or interest charges, the goal should not be to eliminate the corpor-
ate tax—even though this is what many commentators have suggested—
but to cut it.238 There are two reasons for this. First, if the corporate tax is 
repealed, tax exempts would escape tax entirely, and foreigners would 
                                                                                                                           
 233. Grubert & Altshuler, Shifting the Burden, supra note 132, at 25. 
 234. For example, if the asset immediately appreciates, taxpayers have the incentive to 
keep the stock—a form of lock-in—so some of this gain is allocated to later years. 
 235. See, e.g., Toder & Viard, A Proposal, supra note 3, at 73–74 (“If the tax rate that 
prevails in the year of realization [is] assumed to apply throughout the holding period, the 
incentive to realize in low-tax years would actually be stronger with the deferral charge 
than under a conventional realization-based tax.”). 
 236. For instance, taxpayers generally have to pay an interest charge on gains from 
Passive Foreign Investment Companies (PFICs) and thus shy away from investing in them. 
See David Kuenzi, Thun Fin. Advisors, L.L.C., Why Americans Should Never Own Shares 
in a Non-US Mutual Fund (PFIC) 2 (2016), http://thunfinancial.com/site/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/Why-Americans-Should-Never-Own-Foreign-Mutual-Funds-2016.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/A79S-7SLM] (“The tax treatment of PFICs is extremely punitive 
compared to the tax treatment of similar investments that are incorporated in the U.S.”). 
 237. David Miller has also suggested imposing mark-to-market accounting only on 
taxpayers with sufficiently high incomes on the theory that they have the sophistication 
and liquidity to be taxed in this way. See David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark-to-
Market Taxation, 121 Tax Notes 213, 213 (2008). 
 238. For example, in 2014 Professors Toder and Viard proposed to use mark-to-
market accounting to eliminate the corporate tax. Toder & Viard, Major Surgery Needed, 
supra note 3, at 26. In so doing, they followed Victor Thuronyi and David Shakow. See 
Shakow, supra note 3, at 1134–37; Thuronyi, supra note 3, at 110. In contrast, Grubert and 
Professor Altshuler proposed to keep the corporate tax, but at a 15% rate. Grubert & 
Altshuler, Shifting the Burden, supra note 132, at 25. Notably, in a revised version of their 
proposal in 2016, Professors Toder and Viard opted to keep a 15% corporate tax. See 
Toder & Viard, A Proposal, supra note 3, at 12. 
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(mostly) do so as well, unless the treatment of these taxpayers changes.239 
Second, collecting some tax from corporations relieves pressure on the 
shareholder tax. The shareholder rate does not have to increase as 
much, so shareholder distortions are not as severe (e.g., at the boundary 
between mark-to-market and realization).240 Therefore, even when 
fundamental reforms strengthen the shareholder tax, two taxes still have 
advantages over one. 
D. Imputation 
Still another reform option, an imputation system, adheres to this 
Essay’s core recommendation by collecting tax from both corporations 
and shareholders. The corporation pays the first tax, and shareholders 
pay a second tax at their individual marginal rates.241 Since shareholders 
can claim a credit for tax already paid by the corporation, the corporate 
tax functions as a withholding tax. For instance, if the corporate tax is 
35%, a shareholder whose marginal rate is 40% pays an additional 5% of 
tax, while a shareholder whose marginal rate is 20% receives a 15% 
refund.242 
The combined effect is to tax business profits at a shareholder’s 
individual marginal rate. Since a shareholder’s bracket depends on her 
other income, using this rate advances distributional goals. Another 
advantage is that this rate is also used for pass-through entities, as well as 
for corporate debt. Therefore, as Professor Alvin Warren has empha-
sized, imputation systems conform the rates for corporations and pass-
through businesses, as well as for corporate debt and equity.243 
                                                                                                                           
 239. One way to avoid these gaps is to collect this mark-to-market tax from the 
corporation instead of from shareholders. Professor Halperin has suggested imposing a 
tax on publicly traded corporations, which would be based on changes in their market 
value in the relevant tax year. Professor Halperin considers pairing this tax with an 
imputation system, so shareholders can claim a credit for tax paid by the corporation. As 
long as this credit is not available to tax exempts and foreigners, tax is still collected 
(indirectly) from them. See Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for 
Research, 24 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 493, 501, 507, 509 (1998). 
 240. In proposing a mark-to-market shareholder tax to replace the corporate tax, 
Professor Joseph Dodge offers a different reason to retain a second tax: “offer[ing] a 
vehicle to deliver modest tax preferences.” Dodge, supra note 3, at 308. 
 241. See Warren, ALI Integration Report, supra note 24, at 639–41 (discussing the 
benefits of imputation systems). 
 242. For instance, if a corporation with earnings of $10 per share pays $3.50 of 
corporate tax and a dividend of $6.50 per share, its shareholders pay tax on the full $10 of 
earnings per share—instead of on the $6.50 of cash they receive—while also claiming a 
$3.50 credit for the corporate tax already paid. Under this approach, shareholders in the 
40% bracket owe a total of $4.00 per share so—in addition to the $3.50 credit—they pay 
$0.50 per share. In contrast, shareholders in the 20% bracket owe only $2.00, and thus 
receive a $1.50 per share refund. 
 243. See Warren, ALI Integration Report, supra note 24, at 649–52. 
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If an imputation system is enacted, will it deter the various planning 
strategies considered in this Essay? Overall, this reform is fairly effective 
in discouraging these strategies. A key reason is that an imputation 
system relies on two points of collection, instead of on one. As a result, 
the corporate tax backstops the shareholder tax. For example, the cor-
porate tax can still reach foreign and tax-exempt shareholders indirectly, 
as long as they cannot claim a credit for this corporate tax.244 Likewise, 
the shareholder tax can still backstop the corporate tax. For instance, 
income that is shifted abroad can still be taxed (eventually) at the 
shareholder level (when shareholders receive a dividend or sell stock); if 
no corporate tax was paid, shareholders cannot claim a credit. 
Arguably, corporate and shareholder taxes backstop each other 
more effectively in imputation systems than under current law, since 
these taxes are better coordinated. When a corporation cuts its tax bill, it 
reduces the credit available to shareholders. As a result, income shifting 
and other corporate planning becomes less attractive, since it 
(potentially) increases the shareholder tax.245 Some studies suggest that 
corporations engage in less planning under an imputation system (e.g., 
in Australia) and ramp up planning when imputation is repealed (e.g., in 
Europe).246 
Yet this effect should not be overstated, since corporations still have 
three reasons to cut their tax bills under imputation systems. First, these 
efforts still help shareholders who cannot claim a credit for corporate tax 
and thus do not face higher shareholder taxes when the corporation cuts 
its tax bill. Since tax-exempt and foreign shareholders are likely to be in 
this position, they will prefer firms with low effective tax rates. Indeed, 
                                                                                                                           
 244. Notably, European systems used to rely on imputation but stopped using these 
credits when the European Court of Justice ruled that they had to be equally available to 
foreign investors from other European-jurisdiction nations. See Graetz & Warren, 
Unlocking Business Tax Reform, supra note 139, at 709. 
 245. See Graetz & Warren, Integration of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes, supra 
note 45, at 12 (“[A]s in the Australian system, the incentives for corporations to shift their 
income or their domicile abroad could be reduced.”); see also Richard Vann, Corporate 
Tax Reform in Australia: Lucky Escape for Lucky Country?, 1 Brit. Tax Rev. 59, 65 (2013) 
(“The imputation system was thought to put a floor under tax planning by Australian 
listed companies . . . .”); Dan Amiram, Andrew M. Bauer & Margaret Frank, Tax 
Avoidance at Public Corporations Driven by Shareholder Demand: Evidence from 
Changes in Shareholder Dividend Tax Policy 2 (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 
21111467, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2111467 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (“Conceptually, corporate tax avoidance in an imputation system simply shifts tax 
payments from the corporation to its shareholders.”). 
 246. See, e.g., Catherine Ikin & Alfred Tran, Corporate Tax Strategy in the Australian 
Dividend Imputation System, 28 Australian Tax F. 523, 532 (2014) (finding that Australian 
managers whose firms pay “franked” dividends are less likely to defer corporate income in 
advance of an announced reduction in the corporate rate); Amiram et al., supra note 245, 
at 32 (“[P]ublic corporations in countries that eliminate an imputation system increase 
corporate tax avoidance by at least 5.5 percent of pre-tax income . . . .”). 
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activist pension funds and large foreign shareholders will likely lobby 
firms to ramp up corporate tax planning. 
Second, taxable shareholders also have reason to join this chorus. 
Even though cutting the corporate tax bill reduces imputation credits, 
these credits are not always needed. Shareholders have other ways to 
avoid shareholder tax, such as deferring sales or contributing 
appreciated stock to charity. When these strategies are available, share-
holders do not need imputation credits and are happy for the firm to cut 
its corporate tax bill. After all, even if taxable shareholders do not benefit 
when the corporation’s effective rate is lower than their (effective) 
shareholder rate, they do not want the corporation to have a higher 
effective rate. The corporate tax functions as a withholding tax, and 
shareholders do not want the firm to withhold tax that they may never 
owe. For instance, shareholders are taxed currently on dividends but not 
on retained earnings (as long as they do not sell shares). So shareholders 
need imputation credits only for dividends and want the firm to 
minimize the corporate tax on retained earnings.247 More generally, an 
imputation system preserves familiar gaps in corporate and shareholder 
taxes.248 Although it weakens incentives to exploit these gaps in some 
cases, it maintains them in others. 
Third, even when shareholders do not benefit from corporate tax 
planning, managers still have agency-cost reasons to invest in it: 
Reporting higher (after-tax) earnings could inflate their equity com-
pensation or bonuses. This incentive is especially pronounced in the 
United States, where equity compensation is pervasive. So even though 
evidence suggests that imputation systems have discouraged corporate 
tax planning in Europe and Australia,249 these jurisdictions use equity 
compensation far less frequently, so the U.S. experience could turn out 
to be different. 
Therefore, it is too optimistic to expect imputation, on its own, to 
shut down the various planning strategies in this Essay. But imputation 
still is a valuable step, especially if paired with a lower corporate rate, as 
well as other reforms to shore up the corporate and shareholder taxes. A 
key advantage of imputation is that—like current law and unlike some 
other proposals—it relies on two taxes, instead of on one. Imputation 
                                                                                                                           
 247. Even a modest corporate-tax bill should be sufficient to provide imputation 
credits for dividends. Firms that fall short can respond not only by paying more corporate 
tax but also by cutting dividends. Grubert & Altshuler, Shifting the Burden, supra note 
132, at 13–16. 
 248. A response to this limitation is to pair imputation with other reforms. See, e.g., 
Toder & Viard, A Proposal, supra note 3, at 2 (suggesting the adoption of mark-to-market 
accounting paired with an imputation system). 
 249. See Ikin & Tran, supra note 246, at 526 (discussing Australia); Amiram et al., 
supra note 245, at 19, 45 tbl.1 (noting countries in their sample that eliminated impu-
tation were all in Europe: France, Germany, Finland, Italy, and Norway). 
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also has the advantage of coordinating these taxes more effectively than 
current law. 
E. Cash-Flow Corporate Taxation 
A final alternative, a “cash-flow corporate tax,” is a type of 
consumption tax. Its defining feature is that capital investments are 
deducted currently, instead of capitalized. Therefore, this reform avoids 
the challenge of calibrating depreciation to reflect economic reality (or 
encourage investment). As in a 401(k) plan, the deduction of invest-
ments spares the “normal” (or market-wide) return on capital from tax. 
Since this return is not taxed anyway, tax planning is not needed to 
shield it from tax. 
But this reform is still supposed to tax above-market returns (for 
instance, when intellectual property creates market power) as well as 
disguised labor income (when owners are paid a below-market salary). 
Therefore, taxpayers still have an incentive to shelter these returns from 
tax. Although their interest in tax planning is muted, it does not 
disappear. 
Even so, the available planning opportunities depend on how the 
tax is structured.250 A key variable is whether the tax covers economic 
value produced or consumed in the United States. If the tax applies only 
when value is produced here (an “origin-based” tax), firms have an 
incentive to shift income overseas. Admittedly, there is no need to shift 
normal returns, which are exempt anyway, but shifting above-market 
returns is advantageous. This is a significant limitation of the “X-tax,”251 
an origin-based tax endorsed by Professor David Bradford, Robert 
Carroll, and Professor Viard.252 Although they acknowledge this 
problem,253 they rely on current law’s (porous) responses, such as 
                                                                                                                           
 250. For example, Professor Weisbach has described planning opportunities that arise 
when consumption taxes are “open,” which means one counterparty can claim a 
deduction even if the other counterparty does not have an inclusion. See, e.g., David A. 
Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 599, 616–17 (2000) [hereinafter 
Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax]. This is especially true for taxes that are “R-based,” 
which means they disregard financial transactions. See id. As an example, Professor 
Weisbach shows that taxpayers can enter into derivative contracts and then settle them by 
either delivering the underlying property or paying cash. See id. An R-based system would 
account for the delivery of property but not cash. As a result, taxpayers can deliver 
property if they have a loss and settle in cash if they have a gain. See id. 
 251. The X-tax is an origin-based cash-flow corporate tax, which uses a flat rate and 
offers a deduction for wages. A separate tax on wages, using progressive rates, is collected 
from workers. See David F. Bradford, The X Tax in the World Economy 3–5 (Ctr. for 
European Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 93, 2003), http://www.princeton.edu/ceps/
workingpapers/93bradford.pdf [http://perma.cc/UAK6-MKB9]. 
 252. See Robert Carroll & Alan D. Viard, Progressive Consumption Tax: The X-Tax 
Revisited 20–39 (2012); Bradford, supra note 251, at 3–4. 
 253. See Carroll & Viard, supra note 252, at 113 (stating that “[when] the correct 
market value cannot be objectively determined, as will often be true in cases involving 
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transfer pricing and a tax on repatriated earnings.254 Another prominent 
origin-based proposal, Professors Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka’s flat 
tax, shares this limitation.255 
In contrast, there is no incentive to shift income when a tax applies 
to goods and services consumed here, regardless of where they are 
produced (i.e., destination-based taxes). Even if the product is developed 
abroad, this tax still reaches above-market returns from U.S. sales.256 This 
advantage motivates Professor Alan Auerbach to recommend a 
destination-based cash-flow corporate tax257 and Professor Michael Graetz 
to favor a destination-based value added tax (VAT).258 
While immunity from income shifting is a notable advantage—and 
some commentators argue that destination-based consumption taxes 
solve all problems with the corporate tax under current law259—these 
taxes still have familiar limitations. For example, international trade rules 
may block variations that tax wages separately with progressive rates 
(such as cash-flow corporate taxes, but not VATs).260 Another limitation is 
that (by design) destination-based taxes do not reach exports. As a result, 
they collect less revenue from debtor nations like the United States, 
which have to run trade surpluses in the future to compensate for past 
trade deficits and thus will have more (untaxed) exports than (taxed) 
                                                                                                                           
above-normal returns, the origin-based tax offers an incentive to relocate investment 
abroad and to misstate prices to prevent the proper amount of tax from being collected in 
the United States”). 
 254. Id. at 114 (“The Bradford proposal calls for U.S. firms and households dealing 
with foreign related parties to include all inflows both real and financial, from the related 
parties and to deduct all outflows, both real and financial.”). For an illustrative example, 
see id. 
 255. See Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, supra note 250, at 641–42 (noting the 
pressure exerted on transfer pricing under Professors Hall and Rabushka’s flat tax). 
 256. Carroll & Viard, supra note 252, at 113 (“[B]order adjustment eliminates 
transfer-pricing problems between firms.”). 
 257. See Alan J. Auerbach, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Hamilton Project, A Modern 
Corporate Tax 3 (2010) [hereinafter Auerbach, A Modern Corporate Tax], http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/FINAL_AuerbachPap
er.pdf [http://perma.cc/X75V-X37D]. 
 258. See Michael J. Graetz, The Tax Reform Road Not Taken—Yet, 67 Nat’l Tax J. 
419, 424 (2014) [hereinafter Graetz, Tax Reform Road Not Taken]. 
 259. Dharmapala, The Economics of Corporate and Business Tax Reform, supra note 
63, at 25 (“The [destination-based cash flow tax] would solve virtually all distortions from 
the corporate tax.”). 
 260. The problem arises because the rebate that firms collect on exports would be 
based on the corporate rate but some of the tax being rebated would have been paid by 
workers at a lower rate. If the rebate exceeds the tax that was paid, it could be 
characterized as an export subsidy. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected 
International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 1029, 
1048–50 (1997). 
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imports.261 A further concern is that destination-based taxes can trigger a 
one-time transfer from the United States to its trading partners, which 
could be quite large.262 
Given these distortions and leaks, relying solely on one of these new 
taxes—without a second tax as a backstop—can be problematic. For 
instance, an origin-based corporate-cash-flow tax would not reach above-
normal returns that are shifted abroad, but a second tax (e.g., on a 
shareholder’s capital gains and dividends) would reach them. Likewise, a 
destination-based cash-flow tax would not reach exports, but a second 
(e.g., shareholder) tax would do so. In this spirit, Professor Auerbach 
pairs his destination-based corporate tax with the current personal 
income tax,263 while Professor Graetz proposes to use three taxes: a 
destination-based VAT, a corporate income tax (at a much lower rate), 
and a personal income tax (for high earners only).264 
Admittedly, coordinating two taxes can be a challenge. If some 
activity is subject to only one of them, the combined rate varies for 
different activity. For instance, if an origin-based cash-flow tax of 20% is 
paired with a shareholder tax of 25%, only the shareholder tax reaches 
above-normal returns that are shifted abroad. As a result, the combined 
rate for this foreign income (25%) is lower than for U.S.-source income 
(40%). This sort of inconsistency can be conceptually unsatisfying and is 
also likely to induce distortions. Yet these problems are even worse if the 
origin-based cash-flow tax stands alone, without a shareholder tax as a 
backstop. Since foreign income is not taxed at all, the disparity is 40%, 
instead of 15%. So even though the second tax is not a complete 
solution, it is still helpful. 
CONCLUSION 
To sum up, then, a central challenge in taxing corporate profits is 
that corporate and shareholder taxes prompt different tax planning. A 
                                                                                                                           
 261. Carroll & Viard, supra note 252, at 110 (explaining that because “today’s trade 
deficits must eventually be followed by trade surpluses,” a border-adjusted tax would raise 
less revenue and estimating the difference to be $0.97 trillion). 
 262. According to Carroll and Professor Viard, this transition effect arises because the 
tax applies to Americans who fund imports by liquidating foreign assets but not to 
foreigners who finance exports by liquidating U.S. assets. This imbalance should reduce 
the real value of Americans’ foreign holdings and increase the real value of foreigners’ 
U.S. holdings, causing a one-time transfer from Americans to foreigners, which Carroll 
and Professor Viard call “a gift to the world, rather than a gain for the United States.” 
Carroll & Viard, supra note 252, at 110–11 (estimating this increases the tax burden on 
Americans by $7.88 trillion and reduces the tax burden on foreigners by $8.85 trillion in 
present-value terms). 
 263. Auerbach, A Modern Corporate Tax, supra note 257, at 13 (noting that if the 
proposed corporate tax reform is implemented, scaling back favorable treatment of capital 
gains and dividends should be considered). 
 264. Graetz, Tax Reform Road Not Taken, supra note 258, at 424. 
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cut in one tax, which is funded with an offsetting increase in the other, 
mitigates some distortions and leaks, while exacerbating others. To deal 
with these dueling distortions, this Essay recommends keeping both a 
corporate tax and a shareholder tax. If taxpayers are able to avoid one, 
the other can still collect some tax. Moreover, if the goal is to deter 
planning that targets only one of these taxes, repealing this tax goes 
further than necessary. Cutting the rate can also accomplish this goal, 
while generating at least some revenue. 
The two taxes should be coordinated so that, in combination, they 
equal (or approximate) the rate on noncorporate businesses. The 
balance of rates under current law also should shift, so the corporate rate 
is lower than the shareholder rate. In addition, targeted reforms should 
be considered to shore up both taxes, so the combined rate that is 
actually collected comes closer to the one on the books. 
Although this incremental reform strategy would improve current 
law significantly, it still leaves problems unsolved. For instance, 
shareholder lock-in remains a concern, unless Congress charges interest 
on tax deferral or adopts mark-to-market accounting for publicly traded 
stock (and derivatives based on it). Likewise, since the coordination 
between corporate and shareholder rates is likely to be rough, an 
imputation system can improve it. These more ambitious reforms are 
appealing, if the political will can be mustered to enact them. But even 
with more fundamental reforms, there are significant advantages in rely-
ing on two taxes, instead of on one alone. 
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